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JURISTICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction as a matter of right to hear and determine this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Whether or not the court abused its discretion by awarding a default judgment against 
defendant, Ms. White when she was improperly served. 
Whether or not the summons and complaint are fatally defective, because to contain 
Pertinent information, which is required under Rule 10(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedures. 
Whether or not the service is fatally defective, because the summons and complaint fails to 
contain pertinent information on it. 
Whether or not the court's rendering a default judgment against Ms. White without 
hearing the case was an abuse of discretion. 
Whether or not the default judgment should be set aside and the action dismissed against 
defendant, Ms. White. 
4 
Whether or not the standards as outlined in Lucas v. Murray City apply to all public and 
private entities, to include the courts. 
CONSTIUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Article 1 § 7 of the Utah State Constitution (Due Process) 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. 
Article 14 § 14 of the United States Constitution {Due Process} 
No state shall make or enforce any law, which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property 
without due process of law. 
PROCEDURAL PROVISIONS 
Rule 3(a)(1), Utah Rules of Civil Procedures 
How commenced. A civil action is commenced (1) by filing a complaint with the court, or 
(2) by service of a summons together with a copy of the complaint in accordance with Rule 4. 
Rule 4(c)(2), Utah Rules of Civil Procedures 
If the action is commenced under Rule 3(a)(2), the summons shall state that the defendant 
need not answer if the complaint is not filed within 10 days after service and shall state the 
telephone number of the clerk of the court where the defendant may call at least 13 days after 
service to determine if the complaint has been filed. 
Rule 4(b)\ Utah Rules of Civil Procedures 
Under Rule 3(a)(1) The complaint shall be served no later than 120 days after the filing of 
the complaint unless the court allows a longer period of time for good cause. 
5 
Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedures 
Permits a court to reconsider a grant of summary judgment when the party seeking 
reconsideration presents legal theories that have not been considered already, and presents 
material facts that have not been considered before this court at the time of the original decision 
to grant summary judgment. 
Rule 12(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedures 
Every defense, in law or fact, to claim relief in any pleading, whether a claim, 
counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto 
if one is required, except that the following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by 
motion: 
1. ... 
2. ... 
3. ... 
4. Insufficiency of Process, 
5. Insufficiency of Service of Process, 
6. ... 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This action is to dismiss the Summons, Complaint and its subsequent service due to a 
fatally defective summons. The Summons and/or Complaint failed to contain pertinent 
information. On the summons and/or complaint, which is required under the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedures, 
6 
The court and plaintiff continues to ignore the Utah Rules of Civil Procedures when they 
litigate cases. The courts and plaintiff have policies and procedures to comply with and the court 
and the plaintiff continue to willfully ignore those rules and procedures. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On 25 July 2002, Defendant filed a Motion to dismiss the action, because the Plaintiff 
failed to have the Defendant properly served. 
2. On 16 October 2002, the court signed an order granting the plaintiffs Summary 
Judgment. The court prior to this never considered the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. 
3. On 31 October 2002, Defendant filed a Motion to Reconsider Grant of Summary 
Judgment. 
4. On 29 November 2002, the court denied the Defendant's Motion to Reconsider Grant 
Of Summary Judgment. 
ARGUMENT(S) 
It is the position of the defendant that the summons together with the copy of the 
Complaint and the subsequent service of these documents are fatally defective, because 
They do not contain pertinent information on them, which is required under the Rule 10(a) 
Of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedures. 
In this case the plaintiff failed to do so and their mistake could and must be 
classified as fatal. 
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The defendant can attack a fatally defective summons and its service at anytime. 
The court failed to obtain jurisdiction over defendant, Ms. White because of improper 
service the court and plaintiff failed to comply with the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedures as established by the Utah State Supreme Court. 
In addition to this the plaintiff failed to ensure that the required information was 
Contained in the summons and/or complaint the defendant's rights under Article 1 § 7 of 
The Utah State Constitution and Article 14 of the United States Constitution to due 
process. 
These Requirements are necessary for any defendant to properly defend, if it is not 
provided then one cannot be required to properly defend the matter. Furthermore, 
because the court failed to ensure that the defendant, Ms. White was improperly served, 
violated her rights under Article 1 § 7 of the Utah State Constitution and Article 14 of the 
United States Constitution to due process. These requirements are necessary for any 
defendant to properly defend, if it is not provided then one cannot be required to properly 
defend the matter. 
These matters are more fully disputed below. 
POINT 1 
DEFENDANT CAN ATTADCK FATALLY DEFECTIVE SUMMONS AND 
SERVICE AT ANYTIME 
Pursuant to the provisions of Rule 12(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedures it states, 
8 
ccEvery defense, in law or fact, to claim relief in any pleading, whether a claim, 
counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall be asserted in the responsive pleading 
thereto if one is required, except that the following defenses may at the option of the 
pleader is made by motion: 
8. ... 
9. ... 
10. Insufficiency Of Process, 
11. Insufficiency of Service of Process, 
12. ..." 
The rule is clear at the point of the pleader the following defenses may be made by 
motion: 
a. Insufficiency of Process and 
b. Insufficiency of Service of Process. 
The service process server failed to annotate their name, date, time, and official 
Title if any, which is required under Rule 4(k 
) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedures 
And Utah Code Annotated § 78-12a-2(3) . 
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POINT II 
COURT FAILED TO OBTAIN JURISTICTION 
Rule 4(g) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedures states. 
Five days after service of process, proof thereof shall be made by written 
admission or waiver of service by person to be served, duly acknowledged or otherwise 
proved, is purposed to safeguard against entering default judgment against persons except 
where it is satisfactorily appears that they that they have consented thereto. 
Defendant Ms. White was not properly served in this action. The court 
Does not have jurisdiction over a party who has been improperly served. The court in 
Locke v. Peterson. 285 P2d 111 and Callahan v. Sheafer 877 P.2d 1259. 
Plaintiff failed to file a Return of Service which is in violation of 
Rule 4(h) of the Rules of Civil Procedure. There was no written admission or waiver filed 
with the court within the five days of service from the service processor, plaintiff, or 
plaintiffs Attorney. 
There was no written admission or waiver filed with the court within 
The five days of service from the service processor, plaintiff, or plaintiffs 
Attorney. 
The Plaintiff then failed to file an Answer to the Motion for dismissal and 
Proceeded to file a Summary Judgment Motion nine months later not in the 120 day 
Allotted time from the court. This is required under Rule (4) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedures. 
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By the clear language of the rule"..., at the option of the pleader be made 
motion". The defendant clearly followed this rule. 
Therefore, the defendant can attack the case at any time by motion pursuant to the 
language of the rule. The defendant moves this court for an order reversing the lower 
court default judgment and dismissing this action all together, because the court should 
have never entered a default judgment against the defendant when there was absolutely no 
evidence to show that she was properly served and the plaintiff and his attorney 
new the time allowed in filing Answers and Motions in a case is not nine months. 
Therefore, Under Rule 4(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure the court should 
Have dismissed this action based on the Summons and Complaint not being served within 
The 120 days. 
The court abused its discretion when it entered a default judgment against the 
Defendant Ms. White, when many of the proper Rules of Civil Procedure have been 
Violated in this action. Therefore, the court never obtained jurisdiction over defendant, 
Ms. White because of improper service, process, and procedure. 
Therefore, the court clearly abused its discretion by entering a default 
Judgment against Ms. White, where the court did not have jurisdiction to enter 
A default judgment against her. The court in Garcia v. Garcia^ 712 P.2d 288 
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Stated, 
"The requirements of this rule relating to service of process are jurisdictional". 
The court in the defendant cs Ms. White's case never obtained jurisdiction over 
defendant, because of improper service and procedure, the record clearly reflects 
this. 
Therefore, this case must be dismissed and the defendant moves this court 
To reverse the decision of the lower court. 
POINT III 
THE COURTS ABIUSE AND DISCRETION NOTWITHSTANDING UNRESOLVED 
ISSUES AND FACT 
There are numerous genuine issues and facts of material facts at issue in this case, 
Which was required to be resolved before any Summary Judgment could be issued 
In accordance with Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedures as interpreted by 
Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Constructors. Inc. 761 P2d 42 (Utah Ct. app. 1988). 
In the Reconsidering the Motion for Granting the Summary Judgment there 
Lists numerous issues that need to be resolved and heard before granting of the Summary 
Judgment. The Reconsideration for Granting the Summary Judgment Motion has already 
been made available to you who were included in the Docketing Statement. 
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POINT IV 
PLAINTIFF AND COURT FAILED TO COMPLY WITH PROCEDURES AS 
ESTABLISHED BY THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
The Utah State Supreme Court has established procedures for which the 
court, its officials and all attorneys or pro se litigants are required to perform when 
litigating a case before the court. The court in turn is required to ensure that the 
procedures are being adhered to, but they don't. The Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedures clearly establish what a litigant is required to do. 
The Utah Supreme court in Lucus v. Murray City (Civil Service 
Commission). 949 P.2d 746 states, 
"Any public entity who has rules, regulations or policies must comply with 
them and the employee has a right to rely on them". 
The court's by definition is a public entity. The court and the parties' have 
procedures imposed upon them by the Utah Supreme Court by and through the 
"Utah Rules of Civil Procedures'9. Rule 1(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure clearly states, 
"These rules shall govern the procedures in the courts of the State of Utah 
in all actions, suits, and proceedings of a civil nature, whether cognizable at law or 
equity..." 
13 
Rule 10(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedures mandate that all 
pleadings or other papers filed with the court must contain the specified 
information as contained in the rule. In other cases the courts have ruled that if the 
information as required buy the rule is missing it renders the pleading fatally 
defective and the court fails to obtain jurisdiction over the defendant and the case 
must be dismissed. 
The court must impose and mandate upon the lower court that they and the 
parties' must adhere to the procedures as they are mandated. The defendant 
moves this court to impose the same standards as delineated in Lucas upon all 
public and private entities alike and to impose that they must comply with the 
policies, rules and procedures they establish and if they do not then they adversely 
affected persons who can challenge the action. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the court records and dockets reflect everything that has 
happened in this matter. The pleading fail to contain pertinent and necessary 
information as outlined in Rule 10(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedures, If the 
information as required under the rule is missing it would render the summons, 
complaint and its subsequent service fatally defective and the case must be 
dismissed. 
The court in Lucas, supra, mandated that any public entity that had rule 
and policies must comply with those rules and policies. This would include the 
courts. The court is a public entity and has rules and procedures called, "The 
14 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedures". The high court ruled that the public entity had to 
comply with its rules, policies and procedures and the employee had a right to rely 
on them. The defendant's position is that this case applies here. The court is a 
public entity and a litigant has a right to rely on the rules, policies and procedures, 
which apply to the court. They are required to comply all the time and the other 
litigants have a right to rely on those rules, policies and procedures. 
The court was provided a copy of the Reconsideration of the Summary 
Judgment Motion. In accordance with Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedures this case should have had the opportunity to be heard as interpreted by 
Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Constructors, Inc. 761 P2d (Utah Cy. App. 1988). 
These issues were never heard and under these grounds there should be an 
immediate dismissal. 
Because the plaintiff failed to ensure that the required information was 
contained in the summons and/or complaint the defendant's right under 
Article 1§ 7 of the United States Constitution and Article 14 of the United States 
Constitution to due process. These requirements are necessary for any defendant 
to properly defend the matter. Furthermore, because the court failed to ensure that 
the defendant, Ms. White was properly served, violated her rights under Article 1 § 
7 of the United State Constitutions and Article 14 of the United States 
Constitution to due process. These requirements are necessary for any defendant 
to properly defend, if it is not provided then one cannot be required to properly 
defend the matter. 
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Therefore, the court must rule that the summons and/ or complaint have 
pertinent information, which is mandatory under the rules and governing the time 
allowed to file the written notice with the courts, and the rules pertaining to the 
amount of time allowed to file an Answers and Complaints within a decent time 
frame, even if it is not within the time allowed by the courts, not 9 months when it 
should have been within 120 days. All of these issues brought before the court 
makes the service fatally defective. The defendant also believes that the court 
should make the provisions as outline in Lucas applicable to all entities, public or 
private. The defendant npves the court to dismiss this action. 
Dated this E day of April 2003. 
Respectfttfly Submitted, 
±J? 
tena White 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAIL 
I certify that on this 1st day of April 2003,1 personally placed a true and correct copy of 
the "Appellant Brief', in a sealed envelope. I further placed the same in the United States Postal 
Service and addressed it to the following: 
Jeremy M. Hoffman 
Young, Adams & Hoffman, LLP 
170SouthMain Street, Suite 1025 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 -1654 
Signature 
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CALLAHAN v. SHEAFFER 
Cite as 877 P.2d 1259 (UtahApp. 1994) 
Utah 1259 
OH 535 (Utah 199S;; Beck v. Fanners Ins. 
Exch , 701 P.2d 795, 801 (Utah 1985); Camp-
bell v State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 
g40 P.2d 130, 137 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 
S53 P.2d 897 (Utah 1992); accord Heredia, 
279 Cal.Rptr. at 518 (the duty to defend ends 
with the policy limits, assuming no prejudice 
attaches to the insured); Johnson, 248 Cal. 
Rptr. at 417 & insurer tenders its policy 
limits in response to the demand of its in-
sured prior to the initiation of litigation aris-
ing from an accident, insurer generally has 
no further duty to defend); Kantack v. Pro-
gressive Ins. Co., 618 So.2d 494, 497 (La.Ct. 
App. 1993) (an insurer must make every ef-
fort to avoid prejudicing its insured by the 
timing of its withdrawal). 
In this case, Fanners paid the policy limit 
of $500 to Simmons before any action was 
brought by Clayson. In fact, Farmers paid 
the policy limit within twelve days after re-
ceiving Simmons's demand for payment. 
Clayson's suit was filed ten months after 
Simmons received payment. See Johnson, 
248 Cal.Rptr. at 417 (stating that because 
insurer paid policy limits within two weeks of 
insured's demands and litigation began some 
six months thereafter, court found no further 
duty to defend). Farmers did not abandon 
Simmons mid-course in litigation, and Sim-
mons suffered no prejudice because Farmers 
refused to defend her. Having paid the lim-
its of liability in settlement of her claim, 
Farmers's duty to defend Simmons came to 
an end. 
CONCLUSION 
Simmons's appeal was from a final appeal-
able order, thus we have jurisdiction to hear 
this appeal. The trial court properly deter-
mined the insurance policy provided $500 
collision coverage for damage to the horse 
trailer. Further, the trial court also properly 
refused to require Farmers to defend Sim-
mons against Clayson's suit because it had 
already paid the policy limits to Simmons. 
We do not address the issues concerning 
Farmers's duty of good faith and fair dealing 
because they were not raised below. Accord-
ingly, we affirm. 
BENCH and GREENWOOD, JJ„ concur. 
i | KEY NUMBER SYSTEM 
^ 
Geraldine CALLAHAN, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v. 
John D. SHEAFFER, Jr., and Dart, 
Adamson & Kasting, Defendant 
and Appellee. 
No. 930518-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Julv 1. 1994. 
Duty of Good Faith 
[10] Simmons also asserts that Farmers 
breached the constructive duty of good faith 
and fair dealing when it issued her an insur-
ance pohc\ with a $500 deductible on a car 
valued at $350 and when it failed to defend 
Simmon* in the suit brought by Claj'son. 
because these issues were not raised below, 
^
e
 will not consider them on appeal. See 
°»gl»ri (U.S.A.) Inc. v 11th Ave. Corp.. 850 
p
-2d 447, 455 (Utah 1993); Smith v. Iversen, 
*& P.2d 677, 677 (Utah 1993;; Wade v. 
*
taH'l 869 P.2d 9, 11 (Utah App.1994); Jen-
klll!> *-• Weis. 868 P.2d 1374. 1380 (Utah 
ApD.iaq^ 
Client brought legal malpractice action 
against attorney and law firm. The Third 
District Court, Salt Lake County, Leslie A. 
Lewis, J., entered summary judgment for 
attorney and firm, and client appealed. The 
Court of Appeals, Jackson, J., held that 
client's prior legal malpractice action "failed'* 
within meaning of savings statute when it 
was dismissed without prejudice by trial 
court for failure to sen e summons and com-
plaint within 120 days of filing, rather than 
upon expiration of 120-day period and, thus, 
her action, filed within one year of dismissal, 
was timely 
•'oTov^nr' and remanded. 
1260 Utah 877 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
1. Appeal and Error <£=>842(2) 
As summary judgment, by definition, de-
cides only questions of law, Court of Appeals 
reviews trial court's conclusions for correct-
ness. 
2. Appeal and Error c=>863 
Court of Appeals gives no deference to 
trial court's determination of issues on sum-
mary judgment. 
5. Pretrial Procedure c=>560 
Failure of cause of action for failure to 
serve summons and complaint within 120 
days of filing is not automatic; dismissal 
depends upon application of any party or 
upon court's own initiative, and, unless and 
until dismissal, party may preserve action 
under proper circumstances as trial court 
may enlarge time for service if appropriate 
motion is made and failure was result of 
excusable neglect. Rules Civ.Proc, Rules 
4(b), 6(b). 
1. Senior Judge Regnal W Garff, acting pursuant 
to appointment under Utah Code Ann § 78-3-
Lynn P. Heward, Salt Lake Citt, for ap-
pellant. 
Michael F. Skolnick and Carman E. Kipp. 
Salt Lake City, for appellee. 
Before BENCH, JACKSON and GARFF,1 
JJ. 
OPINION 
JACKSON, Judge: 
Plaintiff Geraldine Callahan appeals the 
trial court's grant of summary judgment in 
favor of defendants. We reverse. 
FACTS 
Callahan retained attorney John Sheaffer 
to represent her in a divorce proceeding that 
commenced in April 1987. She urged Sheaf-
fer to take the necessary steps to preserve 
her rights under her husband's retirement 
plan. On January 21, 1988, Callahan discov-
ered that her husband irrevocably changed 
his beneficiary designation under the plan, 
thereby eliminating Callahan's survivor inter-
est. On July 26, 1991, Callahan filed a legal 
malpractice suit against Sheaffer and his law 
firm. The trial court dismissed the com-
plaint without prejudice on January 27, 1992, 
for failure to serve a summons within 120 
days of the filing as required by Rule 4(b) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. On May 
21, 1992, Callahan filed another malpractice 
suit against Sheaffer and his law firm. The 
court, however, ruled that the statute of limi-
tationb had run and granted summary judg-
ment in favor of defendants. Callahan ap-
peals the summary judgment. 
ANALYSIS 
[1,2] Because summary judgment, by 
definition, decides only questions of law. we 
review the trial court's conclusions for cor-
rectness. EC A Health Sews. v. St Mcuk'b 
Chanties, 846 P.2d 476, 481 (Utah App.199:]). 
We give no deference to the trial court'* 
24(10) (1992J 
3. Limitation of Actions C=>95(11) 
/ Statute of limitations for legal malprac-
/ tice begins to run when alleged act of legal 
/ malpractice is discovered or, in exercise of 
/ reasonable care, should have been discover-
ed. U.C.A.1953, 78-12-25. 
\( 4> Limitation of Actions c=>130(9) 
| For purposes of savings statute, client's 
I initial legal malpractice action "failed" when 
! it was dismissed without prejudice by trial 
' court for failure to serve summons and com-
plaint within 120 days of filing, rather than 
upon expiration of 120-day period 155 days 
before dismissal, and, thus, her action, filed 
within one year of dismissal, was timely: 
dismissal for failure to timely serve summons 
and complaint was not automatic, but, rather, 
depended upon application of party or trial 
court's own initiative, and possibility existed 
that client could have preserved initial action 
even after she failed to make timely service. 
Rules Civ.Proc, Rules 4(b), 6(b); U.C.A. 
1953, 78-12-25. 78-12-40. 
See publication Woids and Phiases 
for othei judicial constructions and def-
initions 
CALLAHAN v. SHEAFFER 
Cite as 877 P.2d 1259 (Utah App. 1994) 
Utah 1261 
determination of issues on summary judg-
ment. Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 
p.2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993). 
[3] This case requires us to determine 
the applicability of the savings statute, Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-12-40 (1992), to the statute 
of limitations on a legal malpractice action. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25 (1992) allows 
four years in which to bring an action for 
legal malpractice. Merkley v. Beaslin, 778 
P.2d 16, 18 (Utah App.1989). The statute of 
limitations begins to run when the alleged act 
of legal malpractice is discovered, or, in the 
exercise of reasonable care, should have been 
discovered. Id. at 18-19. The savings stat-
ute states: 
If any action is commenced within due 
time and a judgment thereon for the plain-
tiff is reversed, or if the plaintiff fails in 
such action or upon a cause of action other-
wise than upon the merits, and the time 
limited either by law or contract for com-
mencing the same shall have expired, the 
plaintiff, or if he dies and the cause of 
action survives, his representatives, may 
commence a new action within one year 
after the reversal or failure. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40 (1992). Thus, to 
resolve the matter before us, we must deter-
mine when the statute of limitations began to 
run, when Callahan commenced her cause of 
action, when her cause of action "failed," and 
when she commenced her new action. 
[4] It is undisputed that on January 21, 
1988, Callahan discovered the alleged negli-
gence that prompted her to file a legal mal-
practice suit. Under Merkley, this is when 
the statute of limitations on her action began 
to run. M*rkley, 778 P.2d at 18-19. It is 
also undisputed that on July 26, 1991, Calla-
han commenced her legal malpractice action 
hy filing
 a complaint with the trial court. 
Rule 4(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Proce-
dure states that when a civil complaint is 
filed with the court, 
2
- This holding is supported by Luke v Benmon, 
36 Utah 61, 106 P. 712 (Utah 1908) The Luke 
court anaK/ed the application of a savings stat-
ute with urtually identical language to the one at 
i^ bue toda\. The Luke court cited a Georgia case 
m which sen ice of process was required within 
-0 davs of declaring a cause of action. Service 
was not umclv, and the issue in the case was 
the summons together with a copy of the 
complaint shall be served no later than 120 
days after the filing of the complaint un-
less the court allows a longer period of 
time for good cause shown. If the sum-
mons and complaint are not timely served, 
the action shall be dismissed, without prej-
udice on application of any paiiy or upon 
the court's oivn initiative. 
Utah R.Civ.P. 4(b) (emphasis added). Calla-
han did not serve the summons and com-
plaint within the 120 days. Approximately 
155 days later, on January 27, 1992, the court 
dismissed the complaint. Thus, the question 
before us is whether Callahan's cause of ac-
tion "failed" in late November 1991 when the 
120 days expired, or on January 27, 1992, 
when the court dismissed the complaint. We 
hold that Callahan's cause of action failed on 
January 27,1992, the day the court dismissed 
it. 
[5] Rule 4(b) has undergone several 
changes since it came into effect. A change 
of some significance to this case occurred 
when Rule 4 was amended to acid language 
stating that a cause of action was "deemed 
dismissed" for failure to serve a summons 
within the mandated period of time. At the 
time of the case before us, the "deemed 
dismissed" language had been removed from 
the rule. The relevance of this change is 
that for the time peiiod when an action was 
"deemed dismissed" for lack of proper ser-
vice, failure of a cause of action for savings 
statute purposes was automatic under Rule 
4(b). The "deemed dismissed" language 
meant that once the time period for service 
of summons elapsed, no further action was 
necessary for the cause of action to be dis-
missed. Before the "deemed dismissed" lan-
guage was added to Rule 4(b), and as wre hold 
today, after the "deemed dismissed" lan-
guage w^ as removed from Rule 4(b), failure of 
a cause of action under Rule 4(b) is not 
automatic.2 As Rule 4(b) states, dismissal of 
whether the impioper service of process "was 
not onh ground for dismissing the suit, but ipso 
facto terminated the action." Id 106 P. at 713-
14 The Luke court, referring to the Georgia 
case, stated, "the suit 'did not come to termi-
nation the moment the time expired within 
which the clerk might have annexed a process to 
the petition. Vve think that the suit did not come 
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the cadbe uf action after the time for service 
of a summons has elapsed depends upon 
some action, namely, the "application of any 
party or upon the court's own initiative." 
Utah R.Civ.P. 4(b). In the case before us, 
such action was not taken until January 27, 
1992, when the court, apparently on its own 
initiative, dismissed the complaint. 
Defendants argue that "the savings statute 
does not hinge on dismissal of an action, but 
rather upon failure of an action." They ar-
gue further that Callahan's complaint "failed" 
after the 120-day period for service of a 
summons expired. We disagree. Rule 6(b) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allows 
the trial court discretion to enlarge the time 
allowed for service of summons or other ac-
tions, even after the prescribed time for such 
action has expired, if the appropriate motion 
is made and if the failure was the result of 
excusable neglect. Thus, unless and until a 
cause of action is dismissed, a party who fails 
to serve a summons in a timely fashion may 
preserve the action under proper circum-
stances. Because the possibility existed that 
Callahan's cause of action might have been 
preserved even after she failed to serve the 
summons within the prescribed 120 days, her 
cause of action was alive until the court 
dismissed it on January 27, 1992. This is the 
date when her cause of action "failed." Cal-
lahan commenced her new action against de-
fendants for legal malpractice on May 21, 
1992. 
We now turn our attention to the applica-
tion of the savings statute. The savings 
statute "permits a plaintiff whose action has 
been dismissed on non-substantive grounds 
to file a new complaint within one year of the 
date of dismissal, if the dismissal has oc-
curred after the statute of limitations for 
plaintiffs action has run." Moffitt v Baw, 
837 P.2d 572, 573 (Utah App.1992); see also 
Hansen v. Depcnimeat of Fin. Inst, Sob P.2d 
184, 187 (Utah App.1993) (noting failure of a 
cause of action before statute of limitations 
to a tciminauon until the court, on the motion of 
the defendant m the suit, dismissed it ' " Id 106 
P at 714 (quoting W\nn \ BooLei, 22 Ga 359 
(1857)) In Ashutli \ Elh±, 85 Utah 103, 38 
P2d 757 759 (1935), the Ltah Supreme Court 
stated that an action is pending, ' not onh until 
the plaintiff has failed to serve a summons within 
one \ear thereafter, or within a reasonable 
had expired prevented invocation of saving 
statute). In this case, the four-year statute 
of limitation on Callahan's legal malpractice 
action began to run on January 21. 19Sb 
Callahan commenced her cause of action on 
July 26. 1991, before the statute of limita-
tions expired. Her cause of action failed on 
January 27, 1992, when the trial court affn-
matively dismissed it. Thus, under the sa\-
ings statute, Callahan had until January 26. 
1993, to renew her cause of action. Callahan 
commenced her action on May 21, 1992, well 
within the allotted time. Accordingly, the 
trial court improperly granted summary 
judgment m favor of defendants on the 
ground that Callahan's action was untimely. 
Thus, we reverse the trial court's order 
granting summary judgment and remand 
this matter to the trial court for further 
proceedings. 
BENCH and GARFF. JJ.. concur. 
fp f KEYNUMBEPSYSTEM> 
Janet R. COX (Rex), Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v. 
K. Norman COX, Defendant 
and Appellee. 
No. 920818-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
July 5, 1994. 
Decree of divorce was entered by the 
Fourth District Court, Utah County, Lynn 
W. Davis, J., and wife appealed. The Court 
time, or until he has otherwise tailed to pio^c-
cute the action with due diligence, but until 
something is done to put it out of court hi 
Although the court was not referring specificaih 
to the Ltah rule requiring service of summon* n 
is clear that the Ltah Supreme Court requned 
some action to dismiss, or 'put a cause of action 
out of court 
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court, and on February 25, 1985, Judge 
Wilkinson signed a notice stating that "if 
the appeal is not perfected by the 29th of 
March, 1985, then this notice shall serve as 
a dismissal of the appeal with prejudice by-
order of the Court." J On April 1, 1985, by 
minute entry, Judge Wilkinson dismissed 
the case and remanded it to circuit court 
for disposition of sentence. Also on April 
1, 1985, Judge Fishier signed an order 
granting defendant a fourteen-day exten-
sion for filing a brief. Thereafter, on April 
22, 1985, Judge Wilkinson signed yet anoth-
er order dismissing the appeal. 
From the foregoing facts, it would ap-
pear that defendant's appeal was properly 
dismissed at the district court level. How-
ever, we do not reach the merits of that 
decision in view of jurisdictional limitations 
on our review of cases which originate in 
circuit court. We have consistently held 
that under U.C.A., 1953, § 78-3-5, deci-
sions of the district court on appeal from 
circuit courts are final except in cases in-
volving a constitutional issue. State v. 
Taylor, Utah, 664 P.2d 439 (1983). 
Before this Court, defendant urges that 
Judge Wilkinson's order of April 1, 1985, 
conflicted with the extension granted by 
Judge Fishier on the same date. Defend-
ant claims that the motion for extension 
was submitted on March 29, 1985, and that 
the entry of conflicting orders on April I 
1985, was due to a mistake on the part of 
the court clerk. In so claiming, defendant 
has not raised a constitutional issue. 
The appeal to this Court is therefore 
dismissed. 
STEWART, J., concurs in the result. 
/?\_ 
Lou Dean GARCIA, Plaintiff 
and Respondent. 
(c | KEY NUMBER SYSTEM^ 
as* 
i. The deficiencies noted included failure to file 
a transcript and failure to file a statement of 
Charles William GARCIA, Defend 
and Appellant. 
No. 19349. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Jan. 10, 1986. 
Former husband petitioned to obaj 
relief from operation of a divorce decr& 
directing him to pay child support. % 
Third District Court, Salt Lake Countr 
Dennis Frederick, J., denied petition, a& 
husband appealed. Following initial af-
firmance, rehearing was granted. The Su-
preme Court held that: (1) service of pre-
cess on husband at time that he was inca* 
cerated in state prison, by leaving suit-
mons with prison officer, was ineffective; 
SG that couri was without jurisdiction & 
enter original decree of divorce, and (2i 
petition filed some ten years after entry cf 
decree was not too late. 
Reversed and remanded. 
1. Divorce <s=>78 
Service cf process on prisoner by lead-
ing summons with prison officer was no; 
valid under portion of Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 
4(e)(1) permitting service by leaving copy at 
defendant's usual place of abode with some 
person of suitable age and discretion 
"there residing." 
2. Process <3=>58 
Where service is on appointed agent. 
agent must normally have been appoints 
for the specific purpose of receiving Pr0* 
cess, but agent may also be authorized b;« 
law to receive service of process. Ru^? 
Civ.Proc, Rule 4(e)(1). 
points and authorities. By its term: tte ° r o e : 
appcaro to be self-executing. 
£ process 
Prison 
(S=>5S 
officer was not authorized 
t for service of process on a prisoner. 
JSLGV-PTOC.. Rule 4(e)(1). 
4 Divorce <£=>65 
fnal court was without jurisdiction to 
decree of divorce where there was no 
effective service of process. Pwules Civ. 
Proc Rule 4(e)(1). 
i Judgment «=»386«3) 
Where judgment is void because of 
fatally defective service of process, the 
time "limitations of Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 
60(b), relating to motion for relief from 
judgment, have no application. 
i Divorce <s=>308 
Petition for relief from operation of 
decree of divorce directing former husband 
to pay child support, on ground that court 
which entered decree lacked jurisdiction be-
cause there was no effective service of 
process, was not too late even though filed 
some ten years after entry of the decree. 
Mary C. Corporan, Salt Lake City, for 
defendant and appellant. 
Lou Dean Garcia, Salt Lake City, pro se. 
PER CURIAM. 
This case is here on rehearing granted for 
*e purpose of addressing the question of 
jurisdiction. Appellant seeks reversal of an 
wier of the trial court denying him relief 
torn operation of a decree of divorce. 
Jhe parties were married on October IT, 
**8. On December 17, 1968, respondent 
^ a child. Respondent sought and ob-
tained a decree of divorce on March 14, 
4V
'^ at a time when appellant was incar-
^«jd m the Utah State Prison.1 The 
^ault decree awarded custody of the child 
Respondent and ordered appellant to pay 
^ ° per month child supoort, beginning six-
v
 % s after his 
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Cite as 7i2 P.2d 2S8 (Utah 1986} 
In January 1981, appellant was released 
from prison. Appellant sought the services 
of a lawyer in 1983 apparently after state 
welfare recovery services sought to en-
force the support obligation specified in the 
decree of divorce. Counsel filed a "Motion 
for Order of Relief from Judgment" and a 
"Petition for Modification of Divorce De-
cree," both of which wrere denied by the 
trial court. This appeal followed. 
Appellant argues that the divorce decree 
should be set aside under Rule 60(b)2 since 
he was not properly served with process. 
The return of process, signed by a deputy 
sheriff, states that appellant was served by 
delivering a copy of the summons and com-
plaint to "Mr. Johnson, head of State Pris-
on personnel office.'' Appellant contends 
that he never received a copy of the sum-
mons and complaint and that, in any event, 
service upon a prison officer does not con-
stitute effective service of process on a 
prisoner. 
Rule 4(e;(l) provides for personal service 
as follows: 
Upon a natural person of the age of 14 
years or over, by delivering a copy there-
of to him personally, or by leaving such 
copy at his usual place of abode with 
some person of suitable age and discre-
tion there residing; or by delivering a 
copy to an agent authorized by appoint-
ment or by law to receive service of 
process. 
Under the foregoing rule, appellant could 
ha\e been served by delivering a copy of 
the summons to him personally. Case law 
of other jurisdictions generally favors this 
type of civil service of process on prisoners. 
See White v. Underwood, 125 N.C. 25, 34 
S.E. 104 (1899); Merchant's Administra-
tor v. Shry, 116 Va. 437, 82 S.E. 106 (1914); 
Steindler Paper Co. v. Charlevoix Circuit 
Judge, 234 Mich. 288. 207 N.W. 896 (1926). 
Appellant was not served in this manner in 
the instant case. 
Appellant 
^
and Ian was com icted 
•
er
-\ m Ma} 1969. 
lease from prison. 
of burglary and 
[1] The rule also permits service "by 
leaving such copy of his usual place of 
2. All references to Rules 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
herein are to Utah 
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abode with some person of suitable age and 
discretion there residing/' Service was not 
made under this provision since the sum-
mons was left with a prison officer who 
clearly did not reside at appellant's usual 
place of abode.3 
[2,3] The final method by which pro-
cess may be served under Rule 4(e)(1) is 
"by delivering a copy to an agent autho-
rized by appointment or by law to receive 
service of process." Where service is upon 
an appointed agent, the requirements are 
rather stringent: the agent must normally 
have been appointed for the specific pur-
pose of receiving process. See Wright & 
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: 
Civil § 1097. Appellant has appointed no 
such agent in the instant case. An agent 
may also be authorized by law to receive 
service of process. Arguably, a county 
sheriff or jailer might receive service of 
process for prisoners in their custody under 
U.C.A., 1953, § 17-22-6, but there is no 
parallel statute covering persons incarcer-
ated in the state prison. Appellant there-
fore has no authorized agent who could 
receive service for him. 
[4] Under the foregoing analysis, the 
attempted service on appellant was fatally 
defective. There being no effective service 
of process, the court was without jurisdic-
tion to enter the original decree of divorce.4 
[5, 6] Although respondent has not filed 
a brief in this matter, it might be argued 
that appellant's motion to set aside the 
decree is too late. Rule 60(b) provides, in 
pertinent part, as follows: 
On motion and upon such terms as are 
just, the court may in the furtherance of 
justice relieve a party of his legal repre-
sentative from a final judgment, order, 
3. We need not decide whether appellant's "usual 
place of abode" is his family residence or the 
prison. For guidelines on this topic see 32 A.L. 
R.3d 112, at § 16. 
4. The requirements of Rule 4 relating to service 
of process are jurisdictional. See Martin v. Nel-
son, Utah, 533 P.2d 897 (1975); Murdoch v. 
Blake, 26 Utah 2d 22, 484 P.2d 164 (1971); Fibre-
board Paper Products v. Dietrich, 25 Utah 2d 65, 
475 P.2d 1005 (1970). 
or proceeding for the following ^ 
. . . (4) when, for any cause, the s^ 
mons in an action has not been pero 
ly served upon the defendant as ream J 
by Rule 4(e) and the defendant has fa,C 
to appear in said action: (5) the jud-nr^ 
is void; . . . . The motion shall ben^ 
within a reasonable time and for reason 
(1), (2), (3), or (4), not more than thr* 
months after the judgment, order, or p& 
ceeding was entered or taken. 
Under subsection (4), a party has osu 
three months to challenge a judgmer; 
where jurisdiction is obtained on construe, 
tive service (pursuant to Rule 4(f)). s# ; 
Moore's Federal Practice II 60.32; People i 
One 1941 Chrysler, 81 Cal.App.2d 18,18 
P.2d 368 (1947). Even under subsection (5 
a void judgment seemingly must be chal-
lenged within a "reasonable time." Bui 
where the judgment is void because of a 
fatally defective service of process, the 
time limitations of Rule 60(b) have no appli-
cation. Woody i\ Rhodes, 23 Utah 2d 240. 
461 P.2d 465 (1969). 
This is consistent with holdings under 
the Federal Rules, after which our Rules 
were patterned. As noted in Wright k 
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: 
Civil § 2862: 
Rule 60(b)(4) [the equivalent to Utah 
Rule 60(b)(5) ] authorizes relief from void 
judgments.5 Necessarily a motion under 
this part of the rule differs markedly 
from motions under the other clauses o: 
Rule 60(b). There is no question of dis-
cretion on the part of the court when a 
motion is under Rule 60(b)(4). Nor is 
there any requirement, as there usually 
is when default judgments are attacked 
under Rule 60(b), that the moving party 
show that he has a meritorious defense. 
5. In a later paragraph in the cited reference, •• 
is explained that a judgment is not void bccau '^ 
it is merely erroneous. A judgment is void on. 
if the court that rendered it lacked juribdicticr 
of the subject matter, or the parties, or u •• 
acted in a manner inconsistent with due proce^ 
of law. 
^**r a judgment is void or it is valid, 
f i n i n g which it is may well present 
tffrolt question, but when that ques-
ts resolved, the court must act ac-
Bf the same token, there is no time 
^ on an attack on a judgment as void. 
n* one-year [three-month, in Utah] limit 
Lfeable to some Rule 60(b) motions is 
Sitasly inapplicable, and even the re-
fltuiement that the motion be made with-
in a "reasonable time," which seems lit-
jnliy to apply to motions under Rule 
0(bX4}> cannot be enforced with regard 
& this class of motion A void judgment 
cannot acquire validity because of laches 
« the part of the judgment debtor. 
Beeause we have concluded that the trial 
ssrt had no jurisdiction to enter the di-
m e decree in the first instance, the order 
buying relief from judgment must be, and 
» reversed. The case is remanded for 
dttrj of judgment vacating the decree of 
korce because of the ineffective service 
*( process In view of our holding that the 
toee k void for lack of jurisdiction, we 
aed not address points raised in the peri-
l s for modification 
So costs awarded 
STATE v. HARMON Utah 291 
Cite as 712 P^d 291 (Utah 1986; 
she appealed. The Supreme Court held 
that the trial court's failure to instruct jury 
on elements of "attempt'' was prejudicial 
error. 
Reversed and remanded. 
( o f KFY NUMBER SYSTEM/ 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
v. 
=*wma Maurine HARMON aka Shauna 
Johnson, Defendant and Appellant 
No. 20358, 
Supreme Court «f Utan. 
^ n 14 1936. 
^ d n n d a n t * a b C o n u c t e d b e f o r e t h e 
? - District Court, Weber County, John 
Hu.bt, j
 0 a: tH^ptca roboery and 
Criminal Law <3=»1173.2(2) 
Robbery <3=>27(7) 
Trial court's failure to instruct jury on 
elements of ''attempt" in charge of at-
tempted robbery was prejudicial error. 
U.C.A.1953, 76-4-101, 76-6-301. 
David M. Bown, Salt Lake City, for de-
fendant and appellant. 
David L. Wilkinson, Atty. Gen., Salt Lake 
City, for plaintiff and respondent. 
PER CURIAM: 
Defendant was convicted by a jury of 
attempted robbery in violation of U.C.A., 
1953, §§ 76-6-301 and 76-4-101. She ap-
peals, citing as her single issue error by the 
court in refusing her proffered instruction 
on the elements of attempt. We reverse. 
Defendant was charged by information 
with robbery, but at the trial, the court 
granted the State's motion to instruct the 
jury on the lesser included offense of at-
tempted robbery. In its instructions to the 
jury, however, the court merely inserted 
the word "attempted" before the word 
''robbery" in the previously prepared in-
struction en the elements of the robbery 
and read it to the jury as an instruction on 
the elements of attempted robbery. As a 
result, the court failed to instruct the jury 
on the specific elements of attempt con-
tained in U.C.A., 1953, § 76-4-10L Specif-
ically, the court failed to instruct that in 
order to convict of attempted robbery the 
jury must find, beyond a reasonable doubt, 
that defendant's conduct constituted a 
"substantial step" toward commission of 
the offense and tnar the substantial s*er: 
WASATCH LIVESTOCK LOAN CO. v. DISTRICT COURT 
46 P. (2d) 
Utah 309 
WASATCH LIVESTOCK LOAN CO. V. DIS-
TRICT COURT !N AND FOR 
UINTAH COUNTY et al. 
No. 5576. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
June 14, 1935. 
S. Process <§=»34 
Summons served on defendant in dis-
trict court action held fatally defective for 
failure to allege that complaint had been filed 
with clerk of court or that complaint would 
be filed with clerk within ten days (Rev. St. 
1933, 104-5-1, 104-5-2).i 
2. Certiorari <§»36 
Defendant in district court action who 
was served with fatally defective summons 
and whose motion to quash summons and 
service thereof was denied held entitled to 
relief by certiorari in Supreme Court.2 
Proceeding by the Wasatch Livestock 
Loan Company against the District Court 
of the Fourth Judicial District in and for 
Uintah County, and others, for writ of 
certiorari to review an order denying a 
motion to quash the summons in an ac-
tion brought by the defendant Annie Bow-
den, as administratrix of the estate of Jo-
seph H. Bowden, deceased, against the Wa-
satch Livestock Loan Company. 
Order annulled, and District Court re-
strained from taking further proceedings. 
Thomas & Thomas, of Salt Lake City, 
for plaintiff. 
Ray E. Dillman, of Roosevelt, for de-
fendants. 
FOLLAND, Justice. 
A writ of certiorari was issued to re-
view an order of the district court of Uin-
tah county denying plaintiff's motion to 
quash summons and service thereof in an 
action brought by the defendant Annie 
Bowden, as administratrix of the estate of 
Joseph H. Bowden, deceased, against Wa-
satch Livestock Loan Company. Plaintiff 
filed a brief in support of its petition. De-
fendant filed no brief but has submitted 
the cause without brief or argument. The 
record in the case from the district court 
is now before us. The summons served 
on defendant in the district court case 
omits to state whether a complaint had al-
ready been filed or whether one would 
thereafter be filed, thereby wholly failing 
to indicate and to advise the defendant 
therein how the action had been com-
menced, whether by service of summons or 
by filing a complaint. The defendant 
therein appeared specially and moved to 
quash the summons. This motion was de-
nied by the trial court. 
[1,2] The statute requires that a sum-
mons shall indicate by its contents the man-
ner in which the action is commenced. By 
R. S. Utah 1933, 104-5-1, an action may 
be commenced either by the filing of a 
complaint with the clerk of the court in 
which the action is brought, or by service 
of summons. By section 104-5-2 the ap-
propriate language to be used in either 
case is specified; that is, the summons 
must indicate the precise manner in which 
the action is commenced by stating in ex-
press words "which has been filed with the 
clerk of said court," if the action be com-
menced by the filing of a complaint, or 
"which, within ten days after service of 
this summons upon you. will be filed wTith 
the clerk of said court," if commenced by 
service of summons. The summons served 
on defendant in the district court action 
failed to state either alternative, and was 
therefore fatally defective. Farmers' 
Banking Co. v. Eullen, 62 Utah, 1, 217 P. 
969. Plaintiff is entitled to relief in this 
court. Glassmann v. Second District Court, 
80 Utah, 1, 12 P. (2d) 361. 
On the record in this case the court be-
low should have quashed and set aside the 
summons and the alleged service thereof. 
The order of the district court of Uintah 
county denying the motion to quash and 
requiring the defendant to answer within 
ten days is annulled, and the defendant dis-
trict court and the judges thereof are re-
strained from further proceeding in the 
cause of Annie Bowden, as Administra-
trix of the Estate of Joseph H. Bowden, 
Deceased v. Wasatch Livestock Loan Com-
pany, until such time as jurisdiction of 
said defendant is conferred upon that 
court. Costs are awarded to plaintiff here-
in against individual defendants. 
ELIAS HANSEN, C J., and 
EPHRAIM HANSON, MOFFAT, and 
WOLFE, JJ., concur. 
1
 Farmers' Banking Co. 
Utah, l, 217 P. 909. 
y. Bullen, 62 2 Glassmann v. Second District Court, 
80 Utah, 1,12 P. (2d) 36L 
LOCKE v. 
Cite as 28! 
3 Utah 2d 415 
Whitland T. LOCKE, Ralph O. Williams and 
Hayne L. Jarrard, Plaintiffs and 
Respondents, 
v. 
L. R. PETERSON, Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 8329. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
July 15, 1955. 
Motion to set aside default judgment. 
The Third District Court, Salt Lake Coun-
ty, Clarence E. Baker, J., refused to set 
aside default judgment, and petitioner ap-
pealed. The Supreme Court, Wade, J., 
held that where copy of summons left with 
defendant after he was served with original 
was not exact copy of original and was de-
fective and would not have conferred ju-
risdiction, and original copy filed with clerk 
was proper and would have conferred ju-
risdiction, situation created sufficient con-
fusion that motion to set aside default and 
judgment against defendant should have 
been granted. 
Judgment reversed and cause remand-
ed with directions to set aside default and 
proceed to trial on merits. 
1. Judgment <§=>124 
Rule which provides that within five 
days after service of process, proof there-
of shall be made by written admission or 
waiver of service by person to be served, 
duly acknowledged or otherwise proved, is 
purposed to safeguard against entering de-
fault judgment against persons except 
where it satisfactorily appears that they 
have consented thereto. Rules of Civil 
Procedure, rule 4(g). 
2. Process C=M49 
Any proof which sufficiently estab-
lishes that written admission or waiver of 
service of process has been made is suffi-
cient if so regarded by tli2 court. Rules of 
Cn ll Procedure, rule 4(g). 
3. Process C=149 
Where attorney delivered process, and 
defendant signed original copy of sum-
mons m presence of attorney, and it was 
'ETERSON Utah i m 
P . 2 d l l l l 
represented to the court that such was sig-
nature of defendant, rule which provides 
that within five days after service of proc-
ess, proof of service shall be made by writ-
ten admission or waiver of service by per-
son to be served, duly acknowledged or oth-
erwise proved, was satisfied. Rules of Civil 
Procedure, rule 4(g) . 
4. Process €=524 
Where copy of summons left with de-
fendant was not true copy of original and 
did not state whether complaint had al-
ready been filed with clerk of court or 
whether such filing was to be made in fu-
ture, defendant was entitled to rely on his 
copy for such information, and as his copy 
of summons failed to make definite state-
ment regarding filing, it was fatally defec-
tive and jurisdiction of person served was 
not conferred. Rules of Civil Procedure, 
rule 4(g). 
5. Judgment <S=I38(3) 
Where copy of summons left with de-
fendant after he was served with original 
was not exact copy of original and was de-
fective and would not have conferred ju-
risdiction, and original copy filed with clerk 
was proper and would have conferred ju-
risdiction, situation created sufficient con-
fusion that motion to set aside default and 
judgment against defendant should have 
been granted. Rules of Civil Procedure, 
rule 4(g). 
6. Judgment C=M35 
In case of uncertainty, default judg-
ments should be set aside to allow trial on 
merits.1 
Grant Macfarlane, Max G. Halliday, Salt 
Lake G t \ , for appellant. 
Earl D. Tanner, Salt Lake City, for re-
spondents. 
WADE, Justice. 
This is an appeal by L. R. Peterson, de-
fendant, from the trial court's re Tubal to 
set aside a default judgment. On August 
26, 1951, Earl D. Tanner, attorney for 
plaintiffs Whitland T. Locke, Ralph 0 . 
Williams and Ha\ne L Jarrard, respond-
ents here, handed to defendant a summons 
!. L>ah Commercial & Savings Bank v T*u~,bo, 17 Utah 1SS, 53 P. 1033 
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and purported copy thereof requesting him 
to sign the following statement which was 
typewritten on the front of both the original 
and the copy 
"Receipt of this summons is ac-
knowledged this 26th day of August, 
1954, and service of the same is ac-
cepted 
"L R Peterson" 
Peterson signed both the original and the 
purported copy, the original he returned 
to Tanner and retained the purported copy 
The original contained the following pro-
vision 
"You are herebv summoned and 
required to serve upon Anderson, 
Taylor and Tanner, Plaintiff's attor-
neys * * * an answer to the com-
plaint within 20 days after service of 
this summons" upon you If you fail 
so to do, judgment by default will be 
taken against vou for trie relief de-
manded in said complaint, vXK&KYKXX 
which, within 10 days after service of 
this summons upon you will be filed t 
with the clerk of the above court" 
The above part which is crossed out was 
crossed out m the original summons but 
was not crossed out in the cop} so that part 
of the cop} read as follows «* * * 
for the relief demanded m said complaint, 
which has been filed with the clerk of said 
court, and a copv of which is hereto an-
nexed and herewith served upon vou (or)* 
which, \\ithm 10 days after service ot t h ^ 
summons upon you will be filed with tm 
clerk of the above court" 
Plaintiffs' attorne} duly filed the original 
summons with the required copies of the 
complaint with the clerk of the court and 
defendant failed to appear and his default 
a^d de^a It judsm^nt v ere entered a2:1 n^t 
him on October 6, 1954 On Januarv -t-, 
19"5 appellant served notice of h s i^te^-
tion to move t ie COL rt to cet 2< cL th- c -
tault 1 dgiit u Tvvo proT lens are p~ -
scnted 1 D ^ the pioot of serv ie c* 
Sdivuro"'s r°ect the req1 it-err>e^ts ot +--e 
Lt?a Ru c^  oi Cnd P~occdd~e~ T 
Should the court have set the default and 
judgment aside and allowed him to answer 
on the merits? We consider these prob-
lems in the above order 
1 Rule 4(g) of U R C P provide^ that: 
"Within 5 days after service of process 
proot thereof shall be made as follows 
* * * * * * 
"(4) By the written admission or waiver 
of service bv the person to be served, dulv 
acknowledged, or otherwise pro\ ed " 
[1-3] I t is undoubtedly true that this 
requirement is purposed to safeguard 
against entering the default of persons ex-
cept where it satisfactorily appears that 
they have consented thereto Assuming 
that the term "duly acknowledged" requires 
acknowledgement before a notary public 
or other officer entitled to administer oaths, 
the related phrase used m the same context 
"otherwise proved" also imports some 
proof upon which the court mav safelv con-
clude that the appearance is genuine Sub-
division (4) deals onh with the manner of 
proof of a "written admission or waiver of 
service b\ the person to be served" It has 
nothing to do with the manner ot proot of 
other kinds of service mentioned in Sub-
divisions (1), (2) or (3) as contended bv* 
defendant Any proof which sufhcientlv 
establishes that a written admission or 
waiver of service has been made is suffi-
cient if so regarded bv the court Here 
i-he detendanf signed trie statement m the 
presence of the attornev, who is an officer 
o~ the court, m whom the court can prop-
erly repose confidence, and who in turn 
represented to the court that such was the 
signature of the defendant That v c.s un-
qae^tionablv sufficient proof to satisfv the 
requirements of the above rule. 
[4] 2 On the second point we con-
clude that the court should have cet the de-
fault and judgment aside and allowed the 
deierdant to answer on the men's The 
coov of the summons which wa^ i<~ t wi 1 
t1 e detendant was not a true coov ot t ie 
^ - a l ard did not stite vvh ther t e 
c o r r cunt r rd alreadv been filed with t i e 
cieriv ot the coart or whether c ac i n r g 
was to be made in the tuture Th s cOn~t 
* a a+ leacf +wice held Viit where t ie * ~> 
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mons failed to make a definite statement of 
that fact it was fatally defective arid did 
not confer upon the court jurisdiction of 
the person served.1 In this case the origi-
nal summons did- make such a statement 
hut the copy left with the defendant merely 
stated that the complaint had been filed or 
would within 10 days be filed* The copy 
left with the defendant is the instrument 
on which he was entitled to rely for such 
information. 
[5,6] Thus we have filed a proper 
•summons, receipt of which is accepted 
which conferred jurisdiction of the defend-
ant on the court. However if a true copy 
of the summons which was left with the 
defendant had been filed it would have been 
defective and would not have conferred 
jurisdiction. This situation created suffi-
cient con fusion' that the motion to set aside 
the default and judgment against the de-
fendant should have been granted and he 
-should have been allowed to plead con-
sistent with our declared policy that in case 
of uncertainty, default judgments should 
be set aside to allow trial on the merits.2 
Reversed and remanded with directions 
to set aside the default and the judgment 
against the defendant and to allow him to 
file his answer on the merits and proceed to 
trial. Costs to the appellant. 
MCDONOUGH, C. J., and CROCKETT, 
J., concur. 
WORTHEN, J., concurs in result 
HENRIOD, Justice (concurring in re-
sult). 
I concur in the result and agree with the 
principle enunciated by Mr. Justice WADE 
to the effect that a signed statement ad-
mitting service of process satisfies Rule 4 
(g) (the signer thus submitting himself to 
J. See Wasatch Livestock Loan Co. v. 
District Court in and for Uintah County, 
SG Utah 422, 46 P.2d 309; Fanners' 
Banking Co. v. Bullen, 62 Utah 1, 217 
P. 939. 
>ETERSON - Utah
 1 1 1 3 
P . 2 d l l l l 
the court's jurisdiction), but I cannot con-
cuf with the reasons assigned by the main 
opinion why the judgment should have been 
vacated. ~ 
The only determinative point on appeal is 
whether or not defendant should have been 
relieved of a default judgment because of 
excusable neglect. The main opinion says 
the judgment should have been set aside 
because the copy of the summons received 
by defendant was not a true copy in that it 
did not advise whether a complaint had 
been filed or would be filed within ten days. 
I cannot see how this circumstance possibly 
could be ground for vacating the judgment 
on the basis of excusable neglect, since, at 
the worst, defendant could assume only that 
the complaint would be filed within ten days 
and it would be a simple matter to check to 
determine if the filing had been made 
within that time, after which the defend-
ant would have ten days to plead if it had 
been filed. Failure to make such inquiry 
hardly could be said to be excusable neg-
lect. 
However, it appears that the copy of the 
summons bore a case number different from 
that on the complaint and court records, 
that the defendant left the state the day 
after he was served, and that he took steps 
to request the vacation of the judgment as 
soon as he learned of it. The case number 
on the summons was one that had been as-
signed to a case which touched the same 
subject matter, but in which no action was 
taken against defendant. Under such cir-
cumstances, defendant's failure to answer 
easily could have been the result of excusa-
ble neglect under the Utah case cited by 
the majority opinion,—a case somewhat 
similar factually,—and such as to result in 
an abuse of discretion on the part of the 
trial court in failing to relieve the defend-
ant of the default. 
2. Utah Commercial & Savings Bin1* v. 
Trumbo, 17 Utah IDS, 53 P. l(W:j. 
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BARBER v. EMPORIUM PARTNERSHIP 
Cite as 800 P^d 795 (Utah 1990) 
2. Partnership <s=>375 
Utah 795 
Norman BARBER and Helen Barber, 
Plaintiffs and Appellees, 
v. 
The EMPORIUM PARTNERSHIP, et 
al., Defendants, Third-Party 
Plaintiffs, and Appellants, 
N. George DAINES and Daines & 
Kane, Third-Party Defendants 
and Appellees. 
No. 880410. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Oct. 16, 1990. 
Rehearing Denied Nov. 16, 1990. 
Creditor sought renewed judgment 
against debtor and debtor counterclaimed 
alleging creditor failed to offset proceeds 
of execution sale. Creditor added claim to 
determine validity of execution sale and 
debtor added third-party complaint against 
creditor's attorney for abuse of legal sys-
tem. The First District Court, Cache Coun-
ty, Venoy Christoffersen. J., renewed the 
original judgment, dismissed debtor's coun-
terclaim and third-parry' complaint, ordered 
sanctions against debtor's attorney, and 
noted that ruling on whether execution sale 
proceeds would be applied to judgment 
would be made later. Debtors appealed. 
The Supreme Court, Durham, J., held that: 
(1) renewal of judgment was not effective 
against partnership or general partner who 
were not served; (2) matters in debtor's 
counterclaim and third-party complaint 
could not be relitigated; and (3) attorney 
sanctions were justified. 
Affirmed in part and vacated in part. 
1- P>ankruptcy c=>2395 
Action to renew judgment against 
debtor does not violate automatic stay pro-
vision* of Bankruptcy Code; renewal is not 
an attempt to enforce, collect, or expand 
Service on limited partnership may be 
obtained through service on general part-
ner, but service must be directed to defen-
dant partnership and intended as service on 
partnership. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 4(e)(5). 
3. Partnership <S=>375 
Service on partner as individual, but 
not as agent or representative of partner-
ship, brought in only individual and limited 
partnership never became a party. Rules 
Civ.Proc, Rule 4(e)(5). 
4. Judgment <s=>868(2) 
Partnership <s»375 
Failure to serve general partner who 
was jointly, rather than jointly and several-
ly, liable on debt precluded renewal of 
judgment against him, but did not affect 
renewal of judgment against two general 
partners who were served. U.C.A.1953, 
48-1-12. 
5. Judgment <§=>720 
Issues in counterclaim and third-party 
complaint which had been disposed of in 
previous final judgment could not be relit-
igated in action to renew judgment. 
6. Attorney and Client <s=>24 
Sanctions were warranted against at-
torney who persisted in pursuing and seek-
ing remedies after all relevant legal issues 
were settled and thus burdened adverse 
party with expense of legal fees to answer 
matters that had previously been adjudi-
cated. 
Raymond N. Malouf, Logan, for defen-
dants, third-party plaintiffs and appellants. 
N. George Daines, Logan, for third-party 
defendants and appellees. 
N. George Daines, Logan, pro se. 
DURHAM, Justice: 
Appellants challenge a trial court order 
renewing a judgment against them and dis-
missing their counterclaim and third-party 
claim. They also challenge a judgment for 
sanctions against their attorney. We af-
°ngmal judgment. Bankr.Code, 11 U.S. firm but vacate the renewal of the judg-
C
-
A
- § 362(a)(1). r.ent against Dor. White. 
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This case has a long and tortured histo-
ry. Appellees Norman and Helen Barber 
originally filed a complaint in January 
1979, seeking payment of a promissory 
note executed by appellants Von Stocking 
and Don White as general partners of The 
Emporium Partnership, In a judgment 
dated April 18, 1979, the trial court found 
for the Barbers and ordered appellants to 
pay the amount of the note plus interest. 
Appellants challenged the enforceability of 
that judgment in an appeal before the court 
of appeals. Barber v. The Emporium 
Partnership, 750 P.2d 202 (Utah Ct.App. 
1988). They specifically challenged the 
award of post-judgment interest and attor-
ney fees and the determination that the 
partnership agreement did not preclude re-
covery. That appeal was dismissed be-
cause it was untimely. Id. at 203. 
As of March 1987, appellants still had 
not satisfied the judgment. The Barbers 
filed a complaint at that time to renew the 
judgment to avoid its lapse under the stat-
ute of limitations. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-12-22 (1987). After appellants' mo-
tion to dismiss was denied, they answered 
the complaint and filed a counterclaim. In 
their counterclaim, they alleged that the 
Barbers failed to offset the judgment by 
the value of property purchased by the 
Barbers in an execution sale ($20,000). 
The Barbers purchased residential property 
in which they believed Raymond Malouf, 
one of the appellants here and also appel-
lants' attorney, had an interest. The pur-
chase was an attempt to recover part of 
their original judgment against Malouf, but 
his interest in the property was later dis-
puted. 
The Barbers then amended their com-
plaint to add two causes of action, making 
the complaint for renewal their first cause 
of action. Their second cause of action 
included a request pursuant to rule 69(g)(2) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for a 
judicial determination of whetner the S20,-
1. The Barbers state in tneir brief that the\ are 
willing to credit tnis amount toward the judg-
ment if the execution sale is found to ce \alid 
2. This amount included the principal plus ac 
crued interest UD to Marc^ 2" 1Q87 Trie tna! 
000 execution sale was valid.1 Upon an-
swering the amended complaint, appellants 
amended their counterclaim and added a 
third-party complaint against the Barbers' 
counsel for abuse of the legal system in 
pursuing the Barbers' claims. 
The Barbers moved for partial summary 
judgment on their first cause of action and 
for dismissal of appellants' counterclaim 
and third-party complaint. They also 
moved for sanctions against Raymond Mal-
ouf as appellants' attorney for continuing 
to pursue settled issues. The trial court 
granted the Barbers' motion for partial 
summary judgment, dismissed the counter-
claim and third-party complaint, and or-
dered Malouf to pay $3,000 in sanctions. 
The trial judge renewed the onginal judg-
ment, finding $40,884.96 the total amount 
due.2 The judge held that the issues raised 
in appellants' counterclaim and third-party 
complaint had no basis in law or fact be-
cause they had been disposed of in the trial 
court's previous rulings and the court of 
appeals' decision. The judge also noted 
that a later ruling would be made pursuant 
to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 69(g)(2) as 
to whether the Barbers' bid on the Malouf 
interest in the residential property should 
be counted as a partial satisfaction of the 
judgment. 
Appellants argue that renewal of the 
judgment against the partnership violated 
the automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. 
§ 362(a)(1), because the partnership was in 
bankruptcy when the action was initiated. 
This section provides an automatic stay for 
the commencement or continuation, in-
cluding the issuance or employment of 
process, of a judicial, administrative, or 
other proceeding against the debtor that 
was or could have been commenced be-
fore the commencement of the case un-
der this title, or to recover a claim 
against the debtor that arose before the 
ccmmencement ot the case under this 
t i t le. 
judge's order also allowed tor interest that 
would accrue from the date of tne oider The 
trial judge subtracted from the total due an 
interest pavment of- S866.47 made b> appellants 
on December 3i, 1984 
BARBER v. EMPORIUM PARTNERSHIP 
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The purpose of the automatic stay is to 
"protect the debtor from his creditors" by 
providing relief from collection proceedings 
which would "impair the debtor's ability to 
successfully reorganize under Chapter 11 
and to fairly meet outstanding obligations 
to all creditors/' Rogers v. Rogers, 671 
P.2d 160, 164 (Utah 1983); see also Utah 
Farm Prod. Credit Ass 'n v. Labrum, 762 
P.2d 1070 (Utah 1988) (construing the auto-
matic stay provisions in a case affirming an 
order finding attorney Raymond Malouf— 
coincidentally an appellant and attorney in 
this case—in contempt of court for unlaw-
fully converting funds). 
Although this court has never addressed 
the question of whether the automatic stay 
provisions apply to renewal of a judgment, 
there is other pertinent authority. The 
United States Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit recently held that the auto-
matic stay provisions do not "prohibit acts 
to extend, continue, or renew otherwise 
valid statutory liens." The court explained 
its holding: 
Action by a lienholder [to extend a lien] 
does not result in an enlargement of the 
lien, nor does it threaten property of the 
estate which would otherwise be avail-
able to general creditors. To the con-
trary, extension under [the New York 
statute] simply allows the holder of a 
valid lien to maintain the status quo—a
 t 
policy not adverse to bankruptcy law, but 
rather in complete harmony with it. 
In re Morton, 866 F.2d 561, 564 (2d Cir. 
1989). 
State courts similarly have interpreted 
the automatic stay provisions. In Marine 
Midland Bank v. Herriott 10 Mass.App. 
?43, 412 N.E.2d 908, 910 (Mass.App.Ct. 
1980). the Massachusetts Appeals Court 
held that where "the focus of the suit [in 
the non-bankruptcy court] is relief other 
than the actual collection of a debt, the 
judicial proceeding need not be stayed be-
cause the order of [that] court will not 
interfere with the bankruptcy proceed-
ings." The California Coart of Appeal re-
s' Of course, e\en if the Barbers' action against 
the partnership had been automatically stayed, 
the renewal judgments against tne partners 
^ouic not ha\e been affected. 
lied on this language in Barnett v. Lewis, 
170 Cal.App.3d 1079, 1088, 217 Cal.Rptr. 
80, 85 (Cal.Ct.App.1985). noting that the 
automatic stay would not apply to an "ac-
tion to renew a judgment [because it] 
would not have been a direct attempt to 
collect" 
[1] An action to renew a judgment does 
not violate the automatic stay provisions of 
the bankruptcy code. A renewal is not an 
attempt to enforce, collect, or expand the 
original judgment. When the Barbers 
sought to renew their judgment against 
The Emporium Partnership, they were only 
trying to maintain the status quo by pre-
venting the judgment's lapse under the 
statute of limitations. The original judg-
ment against the partnership was final be-
fore the partnership went into bankruptcy. 
Renewing the judgment did not affect the 
partnership's assets or its ability to fairly 
deal with all its creditors and therefore was 
not automatically stayed.3 
[2,3] Appellants also argue, however, 
that renewal of the judgment as against 
the partnership was improper because the 
partnership was not served. Service on a 
limited partnership may be obtained 
through service on a general partner. See 
Utah R.Civ.P. 4(e)(5); Summa Corp. v. 
Lancer Industries, Inc., 577 P.2d 136, 137 
(Utah 1978). However, the service must be 
directed to the defendant partnership and 
intended as service on the partnership. 
Here, the summons and complaint were 
served only on an individual defendant, 
thereby bringing him in as a party. They 
were not served on him as an agent or 
representative of the partnership, and the 
partnership therefore never became a par-
ty. 
[4] Appellants challenge the renewal of 
the judgment because Don White, one of 
the general partners, was not served. It is 
true that the judgment against White can-
not be renewed without proper service on 
him.1 Failure to serve White, however, has 
4. The Barbers concede that the judgmen. is joint 
rather than joint and several. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 43-i_i2 U9S9,. Thu> means that each defen-
WOODY \r. 
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tion, take action to that end. In acting 
on its own motion, the court must pro-
ceed with judicial discretion. Its ruling 
will not be disturbed on appeal unless it 
is manifest from the record that the 
court's discretion has been abused.1 
We believe and hold that in the instant 
case the trial court did not abuse its dis-
cretion, but on the contrary acted with 
judicial propriety looking to the interests 
of all litigants and in promoting their 
causes with reasonable dispatch,—certainly 
in preventing indiscriminate jostling and 
clogging of court calendars. (Emphasis 
supplied.) 
CROCKETT, C. J., and CALLISTER, 
TUCKETT and ELLETT, JJ., concur. 
23 Utah 2d 249 
Bill S. WOODY, dba Woody Drilling Com-
pany, Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Bert RHODES and Vaughn Rhodes, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
No. 11732. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Nov. 21, 1969. 
The First District Court, Box Elder 
-ounty, Lewis Jones, J., set aside a default 
Judgment and plaintiff appealed. The Su-
E - f ^^ TUGkett> J" hdd that Where 
n r e t u r n
 showed that summons was 
^
 e
 on one defendant by leaving copy 
summons and complaint with his wife but 
•Pwy sheriff at t,mp ^ C A - „ , ^ —A~.~~A 
^ .
l t t t t l e of service endorsed 
another d " W l t h % U f e t h a t lt W a S S e r v e d ° n Pendant who although resident of 
Idai jo^; ***kman v. Beckman, 88 
*. Hnrrls' , - x>>2d 8 1 ° (19G5> : H a i ™ 
<***>. u • :UZ i m r - 2 d 4 0 2 
Co. oo, i 0 r n v- ^alifornin-Ora TW„,« 
RHODES Utah 4 6 5 
P.2d 465 
another state was temporarily within county, 
service of summons was invalid. 
Affirmed. 
1. Process €=153 
Where sheriff's return showed that 
summons was served on one defendant by 
leaving copy of summons and complaint 
with his wife but deputy sheriff at time 
of service endorsed on copy left with wife 
that it was served on another defendant who 
although resident of another state was 
temporarily within county, service of sum-
mons was invalid. 
2. Judgment <§=>I53(I) 
Where service of summons was fatally 
defective, judgment entered pursuant there-
to was without force or effect and court 
could properly set it aside even though mo-
tion to set aside default judgment was not 
made within three months period as re-
quired by rules. Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, rule 60(b). 
3. Judgment <§=>I53(I) 
Rule relating to filing motion to set 
aside default judgment within three months 
of entry of judgment has no application 
where default judgment was entered after 
invalid service of process. Rules of Civil 
Procedure, rule 60(b). 
Ted S. Perry, Logan, for plaintiff-appel-
lant. 
Richard F. Gordon, Bngham City, for 
defendants-respondents. 
TUCKETT, Justice. 
The plaintiff commenced this action in 
the court below seeking to recover on a 
promissory note and also on an oral con-
tract to drill a well for the defendants. 
Complaint was filed on February 15, 1968, 
and the summons was served on February 
20, 1968, by a deputy sheriff of Box Elder 
Baker v. Sojka, 74 N.M. 587, 396 P.2d 
195 (1964): 5 Moore's Fed.Prac, Sec. 
41.11(2), 1114: Link v. Wabash R.R. 
4 6 6 Vt&h 461 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
County The sheriff's return shows that 
the summons was served on the defendant 
Vaughn Rhodes by leaving a copy of the 
summons and complaint with Mrs Vaughn 
Rhodes, wife of the defendant However, 
the deputy shenfi at the time of service en-
dorsed on the copy of the summons left 
with Mrs Vaughn Rhodes the following* 
'"Served this summons and complaint on the 
withm named defendant Bert Rhodes on the 
20th day of February, 1968, at Tremonton, 
Box Elder County, U t a h " Bert Rhodes, 
who was a resident of the State of Nevada, 
was temporarily in Box Elder County, 
Utah, and upon his return home he took the 
copy of the complaint and summons with 
him A judgment by default was entered 
against the defendant Vaughn Rhodes en 
April 2, 1968, and the action was dismissed 
as against the defendant Bert Rhodes 
Vaughn Rhodes learned of the default 
judgment in Januar> of 1969, and there-
after in April of that year filed a motion 
to set aside the default judgment The de 
fendant also filed an answer and counter-
claim 
[1-3] After a hearing by the court, the 
court vacated ana set aside the judgment 
It is the plaintiff's contention here that the 
provisions of Rule 60(b), Utah Rules oi 
Civil Procedure, required that the detendant 
file hies motion withm a period of not more 
than three months after entry of the judg-
ment It is quite apparent m this case that 
the facts show an invalid service of sum-
mons 1 The endorsement upon the sum-
mons which indicated that the defendant 
Bert Rhodes was being served would surely 
tend to mislead the defendant Vaughn 
Rhodes as to whether or not he was the per-
son required to answer The service of 
summons being fatally defective, the judg-
ment entered pursuant thereto is without 
force or effect and the court acted proper-
ly in setting it aside The three-months 
provision prodded fo- in Rule 60(b) has 
no application to this situation 
i Columbia Tiust Co v Stemei, 71 Ltaii 
The plaintiff further contends that the 
order of the court setting aside the judg-
ment also dismissed his action W e do not 
interpret the order of the court as goms; 
that far. It appears that the defendant 
having answered and filed his counterclaim 
has now submitted himself to the jurisdic-
tion of the court, and the court can now 
proceed to hear the case on its merits The 
defendant and respondent here does not 
claim that the plaintiff's complaint has 
been dismissed 
The order of the court below setting 
aside the judgment by default is affirmed 
and the case is remanded to that court for 
further proceedings The respondent is 
entitled to costs 
CROCKETT, C J , and CALLISTER 
and HENRIOB, J J , concur 
ELLETT, J , concurs in the result. 
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Ennis D. COVERT, Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
KENNECOTT COPPER CORPORATION, 
a New York corporation, Defend-
ant and Respondent. 
No. 11503. 
Supicme Court of Utah 
Nov 24, 1969 
Action against husband's employer b} 
widow to recover damages for emotional 
distress allegedly resulting from the rau 
tilation of her husband's body during at 
tempt to remo\e him from feeder com 
partment of ore crusher. The Third Dis-
trict Court, Salt Lake County, Stewart M 
Hanson, J , dismissed action on dete^d 
ant's motion fo r summary judgment a^c 
Tax Commission v Larsen 100 LtJii 
10-* 110 POrt ^ f t 
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Edward J. LUCAS, Petitioner, 
v. 
MURRAY CITY CIVIL SERVICE 
COMMISSION and Murray City 
Corporation, Respondents. 
No. 960803-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Nov. 28, 1997. 
must have more than abstract need, desir 
unilateral expectation of it; she must 1 
legitimate claim of entitlement to 
U.S.CA. ConstAmend. 14. 
4. Constitutional Law <£=>278.4(5) 
Officers and Public Employees €=>7 
If property interest in continued pi 
employment exists, then public employe 
entitled to procedures comporting with n 
mum requirements of due process, as pre 
ed in Constitution; however, if no prop 
interest exists, then employee must rely s 
ly upon any procedural protections affoi 
by contract, ordinance, or state stat 
U.S.CA. ConstAmend. 14. 
5. Constitutional Law <®=>278.4(5) 
Municipal Corporations ®=»185(4,6) 
City police officer was entitled to 
process by way of oral or written notic 
charges, explanation of city's evidence, 
portunity to respond to charges in somet 
less than full evidentiary hearing before 
mination, and full post-termination hearh 
meaningful time, as provided in Utah sta 
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 14; U.C.A1953 
3-1012. 
6. Constitutional Law <£=>278(1.1) 
Essential principle of due process 
quires that deprivation of any signii 
property interest be preceded by notice 
opportunity for hearing appropriate t( 
ture of case. U.S.CA. ConstAmend. 14 
7. Constitutional Law €=251.6 
Post-deprivation procedures, while 
constitutionally guaranteed, must cor 
with due process requirements providin 
fan- hearing. U.S.CA ConstAmend. 14 
8. Officers and Public Employees c= 
In disciplinary proceedings, public 
must comply with its own rules and emp 
beimc disciplined is entitled to rely 
tnose riles. 
9. Constitutional Law C=*27SJ<5> 
Municipal Corporations c=>183<3* 
City police officer appealed from deci-
sion of the city civil service commission, af-
firming his termination. The Court of Ap-
peals, Wilkins, Associate P.J., held that: (1) 
commission violated police officer's due pro-
cess rights by excluding from post-termi-
nation hearing evidence of retaliatory dis-
charge; (2) substantial evidence failed to 
support commission's finding that officer lied 
about his gun's position, used to support 
dishonesty charge; and (3) even assuming 
officer was dishonest regarding placement of 
his gun, termination was so disproportionate 
to dishonesty charge that it amounted to 
abuse of chiefs discretion. 
Reversed. 
Bench, J., concurred in result and filed 
opinion. 
1. Constitutional Law c=*277(2) 
City police officer, as civil service em-
ployee, had property interest in continued 
employment subject to due process protec-
tion; Utah statute grants civil service em-
ployees security against discharge without 
cause. U.S.CA. Const.Amend. 14; U.C.A. 
1953,1C-3-1012. 
2. Constitutional Law C=>277(1) 
Property interests subject to due pro-
cess protection are created and their dimen-
sions are defined by existing rules or under-
standings that stem from independent source 
sucn as state law. U.S.CA. ConstAmend. 
14. 
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ment policy and completion of investigation 
within 46 days did not give rise to due pro-
cess violation per se, where, other than as-
serting delay, officer revealed nothing about 
delay and failed to provide any evidence that 
delay wras unreasonably prolonged. U.S.C.A. 
ConstAmend. 14. 
10. Constitutional Law ©=278.4(5) 
Municipal Corporations <©=>185(6) 
City police department complied with its 
policy, requiring written notification to police 
officer of allegations and rights and responsi-
bilities relative to internal affairs investiga-
tion prior to investigation, and thus, due 
process was not violated; although officer did 
not receive written notice of either allega-
tions of excessive force or dishonesty before 
initial interview, officer had actual notice of 
charges, was able to respond to them before 
termination, received written notice of 
charges before termination and failed to es-
tablish how these procedural errors were 
harmful. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 14. 
11. Constitutional Law <3=>278.4(5) 
Municipal Corporations <§=>185(9) 
City civil service commission violated po-
lice officer's due process rights by excluding 
from post-termination hearing evidence of 
retaliatory discharge, where such evidence 
directly related to credibility of two of three 
witnesses upon whose testimony commission 
relied in reaching its decision and witness' 
credibility was directly relevant and material 
to commission's fair evaluation of termination 
decision made by one witness. U.S.C.A. 
ConstAmend. 14. 
11
 Municipal Corporations <®=>185(9) 
k City civil service commission's decision 
S^t city'fe motion in limine without pro-
^ g any findings, conclusions, or reasoning 
arbitrary and capricious, and thus, com-
°n abused its discretion in granting mo-
.deluding evidence of retaliatory dis-
^
e
°
f
 police officer. 
Administrative Law and Procedure 
^485 
^VWy's failure to make adequate find-
act m material issues renders its 
arbitrary and carjricious unless evi-
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dence is clear, uncontroverted and capable of 
only one conclusion. 
14. Municipal Corporations <®=>218(8) 
City civil service commission is local, 
municipal tribunal of limited jurisdiction, not 
subject to Utah Administrative Procedures 
Act (UAPA) or bound by formal rules of 
evidence and procedure. U.C.A.1953, 63-
46b-l et seq. 
15. Municipal Corporations <s>218(8) 
Although city civil service commission is 
not bound by formal rules of evidence and 
procedure, it is not above the law; in absence 
of formal legal rules, commission must deter-
mine what evidence should, in fairness, be 
admitted and evidence must be legally rele-
vant, in that it has some probative weight 
and reliability. 
16. Appeal and Error <s>842(6) 
Whether certain evidence is relevant is 
question of law, which Court of Appeals re-
views under correction-of-error standard. 
17. Witnesses c=»363(l) 
Testimony reflecting on bias and motives 
of witness is admissible at trial. 
18. Municipal Corporations <s=>185(12) 
City civil service commission's error in 
excluding from post-termination hearing evi-
dence of retaliatory discharge in violation of 
police officer's due process rights was not 
harmless, where proffered evidence directly 
related to credibility of two of three wit-
nesses upon whose testimony commission 
relied in reaching its decision and had com-
mission heard such evidence, there was sub-
stantial likelihood of different outcome. 
U.S.CA Const.Amend. 14. 
19. Appeal and Error <S=>1050.1(1), 1056.1(1) 
Erroneous decision to admit or exclude 
evidence does not constitute reversible error 
unless error is harmful. 
20. Municipal Corporations <s=>185(12) 
Although city civil service commission 
may have erred in excluding from police 
officer's post-termination hearing audiotape 
of arrestee, which officer intended to use for 
impeachment purposes, error was harmless, 
where officer had i*cce>* rc> hnt full*A ^ . ~™^ 
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himself of other means available to impeach 
arrestee. 
21. Municipal Corporations <3=>185(8) 
City civil service commission did not ex-
ceed its authority by either deferring to inde-
pendent advisor's legal advice or acquiescing 
to advisor's active participation in police offi-
cer's post-termination hearing, where ulti-
mate responsibility for all these matters rest-
ed with commission and it was at liberty to 
rely upon advice of its chosen legal advisor. 
22. Officers and Public Employees <3=*72.31 
City civil service commission's authority 
on review of disciplinary decisions involves 
inquiries as to whether facts support charges 
made by department head, and, if so, wheth-
er charges warrant sanction imposed. 
23. Municipal Corporations <s=>185(10) 
Substantial evidence failed to support 
city civil service commission's finding that 
police officer lied about his gun's position, 
used to support dishonesty charge; arrestee 
gave inconsistent statements regarding 
placement of gun and unsubstantiated allega-
tions of excessive force, other officer stated 
that he did not see gun pointed at arrestee, 
and officer consistently maintained that he 
perceived his gun to be holstered, but recog-
nized possibility that it could have been un-
holstered and pointed at floor. 
24. Municipal Corporations <s=>218(9) 
Substantial evidence standard applies 
when Court of Appeals reviews factual find-
ings of city civil service commission in disci-
plinary proceeding. 
25. Administrative Law and Procedure 
"Substantial evidence'' is that quantum 
and quality of relevant evidence that is ade-
quate to convince reasonable mind to support 
conclusion. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and def-
initions 
26. Municipal Corporations <®=>218(9) 
Court of Appeals defers to city civil ser-
vice commission's findings in disciplinary 
27. Municipal Corporations <2>185(11) 
Discipline imposed for employee miscon-
duct is within sound discretion of city police 
chief. 
28. Municipal Corporations (^185(11) 
City police chief abuses his discretion in 
imposing discipline on employee if punish-
ment exceeds range of sanctions permitted 
by statute or regulation, or if, in light of all 
circumstances, punishment is disproportion-
ate to offense. 
29. Municipal Corporations C=>185(11) 
Pursuant to city civil service commis-
sion's rules and regulations, providing that 
discipline is vested in appointing power, that 
progressive discipline shall be administered 
by appointing power and that severity of 
offense will determine steps required for pro-
gressive discipline, use of progressive disci-
pline is committed to police chiefs discretion, 
based on chiefs determination of seventy of 
offense. 
30. Municipal Corporations @»185(1) 
Even assuming city police officer was 
dishonest regarding placement of his gun, 
termination was so disproportionate to dis-
honesty charge that it amounted to abuse of 
chiefs discretion, where charge was based on 
unsubstantiated claim of excessive force 
which never determined gun placement, evi-
dence supporting charge was slim and incon-
sistent, other officers disciplined solely for 
dishonesty were suspended and officer's ser-
vice record was exemplary. 
Bryon J. Benevento and D. Matthew Mos-
con, Salt Lake City, for Petitioner. 
H. Craig Hall, Murray, and Dennis C. 
Ferguson, Salt Lake City, for Respondents. 
Before WILKINS, Associate P.J., and 
DAVIS and BENCH, JJ. 
OPINION 
WILKINS, Associate Presiding Judge: 
Petitioner Edward J. Lucas appeals <** 
decision of the Murray City Civil Sen^ 
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mination as a Murray City Police Officer. 
We reverse the Commission's decision and 
reinstate Lucas with back pay. 
BACKGROUND 
Lucas served as a police officer for the 
Murray City Police Department (Depart-
ment) from July 1, 1985 through August 21, 
1996. During that time, Lucas was consid-
ered by his superiors to be an outstanding 
officer. His service record shows that he 
had always met or exceeded the Depart-
ment's expectations and that he received all 
available merit raises. In addition, Lucas's 
exemplary service earned him the "Merit of 
Honor" award—the most prestigious award 
presented to an officer. He is the only offi-
cer in the Department to have ever received 
this honor. Until August 1996, Lucas had 
never been reprimanded, disciplined, or in-
vestigated by internal affairs. 
On August 21, 1996, the Department fired 
Lucas for allegedly lying during an internal 
affairs investigation regarding an allegation 
that Lucas had used excessive force while 
searching an arrestee. The internal affairs 
investigation arose from the circumstances 
surrounding the May 27, 1996 arrest of Mar-
tin Spegar. 
On the evening of May 27, Officers Snow, 
Johnson, and Lucas were dispatched to a 
Murray City car dealership to investigate a 
vehicle burglary in progress. Upon arriving, 
Officer Snow saw two males running through 
* parking lot adjacent to the dealership and 
climbing over a wall Within moments, Offi-
cer Snow received information that three 
^spects had been apprehended. Officer 
h n s o n had one suspect, Dustin Garcia, in 
^stody, and Officer Lucas had apprehended 
pothers , Michael Hambiin and Spegar. 
~ * ^ e it was dark and raining, the officers 
g inned only a basic pat down search at 
OmJTy b e f o r e teking them to the Murray 
&*L Ice DePartment. Lucas transported 
£** without incident, and was, as Spegar 
^ v e r y courteous. 
| 4 ^ 6 S ta t ion ' sP^gar and Hambiin were 
Ifeea,^ f i n i n g office*. Garcia was 
**** f e ^ m t e n i e w room about twenty to 
-
 e t
**ay from both Spegar and Kam-
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biin. Officer Johnson searched Hambiin, Of-
ficer Snow searched Garcia, and Officer Lu-
cas "kept an eye on Spegar." During that 
time, Officer Lucas performed a more thor-
ough search and asked Spegar to empty his 
pockets. After Officer Snow saw Spegar 
emptying his pockets, he walked into the 
room to take Spegar's statement and Officer 
Lucas left. Nothing was said. Eventually, 
all three suspects were searched, mirandized, 
interviewed, and taken to jail. En route to 
the jail, Officer Snow noted that Spegar was 
not upset and was joking with his friends. 
A few days later, Lieutenant Fondaco, Lu-
cas's superior, received a letter about Lucas's 
alleged conduct during Spegar's search. 
Spegar's written statement alleged: 
[Officer Lucas] told me to stand up and 
empty my pockets onto the table, and also 
to take off my hat. He then asked me to 
wait before I did it. He [illegible] for a 
minute and took out his gun from his 
holster and pointed it in the direction of 
my head. He was standing about three 
feet away from me. He then [said] "I dare 
you to pull out a gun because if you do I 
swear that I will [ ] kill you," and that your 
brains will be splattered on the wall! 
I then [said] "Hey man, I might be crazy 
trying to break into cars, but I'm not going 
to pull anything on you." 
[Lucas] said, "I don't care, but I am that 
crazy." 
On June 10, 1996, Lieutenant Fondaco be-
gan an internal affairs investigation into Offi-
cer Lucas's alleged use of excessive force. 
During the investigation, Lucas was inter-
viewed on two separate occasions. During 
the first interview, conducted by Lieutenant 
Fondaco, Lucas described the incident as 
follows. Lucas stated that he walked into 
the room where Spegar was being held. He 
unhandcuffed Spegar and told him to empty 
his pockets. Instead of reaching for his 
pocket, Spegar reached for the crotch area of 
his pants. Lucas testified that he believed 
that Spegar may have been going for a weap-
on because he knew, as a result of his curso-
ry search of Spegar at the scene, that Spegar 
had something in his pocket. Immediately, 
Lucas reacted by pushing Spegar away, yell-
ing "nut voui* handb on the wail/' and rfWh-
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ing for and unsnapping his weapon. He 
stated that he believed that he started to pull 
his gun out, but that it remained in the 
holster. At that point, Lucas searched Spe-
gar's legs and crotch, and then asked Spegar 
to empty his pockets, which contained pliers, 
a flashlight, and other miscellaneous items. 
At some time during the internal affairs 
investigation, Officer Snow gave a written 
statement regarding what he observed. Offi-
cer Snow related that after searching Garcia 
and taking his statement in the interview 
room, he went down the hall toward the 
office in which Spegar was being held. Offi-
cer Snow paused briefly before entering the 
office when he noticed that Officer Lucas had 
his gun out of its holster and pointed at the 
ground, in a "low ready position." He saw 
Spegar standing sideways, not looking direct-
ly at Officer Lucas. He watched as Spegar 
took off his hat and noticed a flashlight and 
pliers on the table. Officer Snow stated that 
as he entered the room to take Spegar's 
statement, Officer Lucas holstered his weap-
on and then left. He stated he did not hear 
or observe anything that had happened be-
fore and stated he did not see Officer Lucas 
point his gun at Spegar. In addition, Officer 
Snow filed a police report and did not men-
tion any of the events he observed between 
Officer Lucas and Spegar because, as he 
stated, "I hadn't even considered it a policy 
violation." 
Garcia asserted that while in the interview 
room, about twenty to thirty feet away, he 
overheard Lucas threaten Spegar. However, 
Hamblin, who was in the office next to Spe-
gar, heard nothing. Moreover, Officer Snow, 
who was en route from Garcia's room to 
Spegar's room, also heard nothing. 
As a result of this information, the focus of 
the internal affairs investigation became 
whether Lucas had been dishonest during 
the excessive force investigation. As part of 
the investigation, both Lucas and Spegar 
agreed to take a polygraph test on July 11, 
1996. During the polygraph test, Spegar 
initially stated that Lucas had pointed the 
gun at his head. Then, as the interview 
progressed, he stated that, looking back, the 
gun may have been pointed at him or else-
however, state that Lucas's gun was definite-
ly out of its holster. During Lucas's poly-
graph test, Lucas stated that he still per-
ceived that his gun was holstered, but that he 
had no reason to doubt Officer Snow's state-
ment. Both interviews were transcribed. 
Lucas's polygraph test could not be adminis-
tered because "yes" and "no" questions could 
not be posed; Spegar's test was inconclusive. 
After reviewing this information, Lieuten-
ant Fondaco concluded that Officer Lucas 
had been dishonest and, on July 26, 1996, 
recommended that he be discharged. On 
August 5, 1996, Officer Lucas received a 
pretermination notice listing four grounds for 
discharge: (1) dishonesty in denying the 
events which occurred concerning a service 
weapon; (2) excessive force; (3) improper 
search techniques; and (4) conduct unbecom-
ing an officer. On August 7, 1997, Chief 
Killian conducted Lucas's pretermination 
hearing. During that hearing, Lucas tried to 
address each of the grounds for termination, 
although the record shows that even the 
Chief was unclear as to what evidence sup-
ported the charge of "improper search tech-
niques." In discussing the charges, Lucas 
again explained: 
Spegar is in my custody. I start to pat 
him down. He's got something protruding 
from his pocket. I grab it and pull on it. 
He starts yelling. What's wrong? He's 
not saying anything, just smiles. It's kind 
of weird. Pulled on it again, obvious dis-
comfort. Well, it's dark here, I can't see 
what's going on. It's rainmg. It's inap-
propriate to do this here. I'm not going to 
unhandcuff him outside in the street to let 
him empty his pockets, and I'm not stick-
ing my hand down in there. I don't know 
if it's a blade. I don't know what's going 
on. So, obviously it's going to be some-
thing he's gonna have to do. I'm going to 
do that in a well-lit situation, in the depart-
ment, so I chose to transport him as such-
Handcuff him in my front seat where 
could keep an eye on him where if he a 
make any further movements, I c a n 
appropriate action. 
I believe he has sharp devices in his poc 
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cause of previous occurrences out in the 
field. Okay, the instructions were clearly 
given. The first thing he does is put both 
hands dii'ectly down in his crotch, the loca-
tion of choice for people out in the street to 
carry a weapon. Now in direct correspon-
dence with my training, I react. My hand 
goes up, and I keep him away from [me]. 
My hand goes for my weapon. I unsnap 
it, and it starts to come out. Now at this 
point, this is where we have a problem 
because I am leaning forward pushing 
against the wall telling him to get his 
hands against the wall, "what the hell do 
you think you're doing?" . . . My percep-
tion when I was questioned about it, it's in 
the holster. Yes, it's ready to come out 
because I am acting accordingly, according 
to my training, and I'm ready to do what-
ever is necessary. 
OR August 21, 1996, Chief Killian ordered 
Lucas's discharge based on dishonesty, spe-
cifically the "untruthful statements" made by 
Lucas during the course of the internal af-
fairs investigation and during the pretermin-
ation hearing. Lucas timely appealed to the 
Civil Service Commission, which scheduled a 
hearing on November 19,1996. 
Before that hearing, the Commission heard 
argument on Murray City's "Motion in Li-
mine" to exclude from the hearing any evi-
dence regarding Lucas's claim of a retaliato-
ry discharge and to exclude witnesses, which 
Lucas argued would testify in support of this 
claim. Lucas claimed that Lieutenant Fon-
daco and Chief Killian's motives for recom-
mending and then ordering his discharge 
^ere based on claims of police misconduct he 
kad filed with the Utah Attorney General's 
office.1 Without any reasoning, findings, or 
•fusions, the Commission granted the mo-
^ ^ r the hearing on November 19, 1996, 
Commission affirmed Chief Killian's deci-
0 0
 ctom dQfm ° r r c l a h a t o r v discharge is based 
officer fii* A m i s c o n d u c t that he and another 
«#»<*** U , t h t h e U t a h Attorney General's 
*«ment A L l e u U i n a m Fondacc and the De 
^ often urCd° r d m g t 0 L u C a s ' L i e u l e n a n l F o n " tQt Has m, «?L ?XCeS5»ve force against arrestees 
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sion to terminate Officer Lucas, finding his 
statements regarding the use of his weapon 
both inconsistent and incredible because his 
statements had "changed substantially" from 
interview to interview. Officer Lucas ap-
peals the Commission's decision. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Our review of the Commission's final or-
der, which affirmed Officer Lucas's discharge 
from the Department, is limited to "deter-
mining if the commission has abused its dis-
cretion or exceeded its authority." Utah 
Code Ann. § 10-3-1012.5 (1996); Salt Lake 
City Corp. v. Salt Lake City Civil Serv. 
Comm% 908 P.2d 871, 874 (Utah CtApp. 
1995). 
ANALYSIS 
Lucas challenges on several grounds the 
Commission's decision to affirm his dis-
charge. Initially, Lucas asserts this case 
should be remanded to the Commission for a 
new hearing because the Commission violat-
ed his due process rights by: (1) failing to 
comply with the Department's policy and 
procedure during Lucas's disciplinary hear-
ing; (2) excluding audiotape evidence re-
quired to impeach Spegar's testimony; (3) 
excluding evidence in support of Lucas's 
claim of retaliatory discharge; and (4) allow-
ing its legal advisor to participate in the 
capacity of a commissioner. In addition, Lu-
cas asserts he should be reinstated with back 
pay because (1) insufficient evidence exists to 
support the dishonesty charge, and (2) termi-
nation is a disproportionate punishment for 
such a charge. 
cle* r K e d m a b l d - nSS i ng scheme involv-
a n e B e ! P a , r , u n d c r D I l c m g These claims, ^ F , .-
ges
- mlunated Ch J Li l ian/ ' uho 
I. PROPERTY INTEREST DUE 
PROCESS ANALYSIS 
[1] Lucas argues he has a property inter-
demanded die claims be dropped and demanded 
to know the identities of the officers making the 
allegations According to Lucas and two other 
witnesses, Chief Killian was aware that Lucas 
had made the allegations of misconduct In re-
sponse, the City provided affidavits from Chief 
Killian and Lieutenant Fondaco, in which both 
stated the\ did not know the identity of the 
claimants. 
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est in continued public employment,2 enti-
tling him to notice and an opportunity to be 
heard before any deprivation of that interest. 
The City argues Lucas was afforded due 
process consistent with that required in Utah 
Code Ann. § 10-3-1012 (1996) and that any 
procedural defect was immaterial to the 
Commission's determination that Lucas's dis-
charge was appropriate. Before addressing 
the specific due process arguments, we must 
first determine if Lucas has a property inter-
est in continued public employment, which 
interest cannot be deprived except pursuant 
to constitutionally adequate procedures. In 
addition, we must determine to what process 
Lucas is entitled. 
[2,3] The Fourteenth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution provides that no 
state shall deprive any person of property 
without due process of law.3 See U.S. Const, 
amend. XIV, sec. 1. While the Constitution 
guarantees due process before the depriva-
tion of property interests, such interests are 
not created by the Constitution. Rather, 
property interests "are created and their di-
mensions are defined by existing rules or 
understandings that stem from an indepen-
dent source such as state law." Board of 
Regents v. Rozh, 408 U.S. 564, 577, 92 S.Ct. 
2701, 2709, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972). "To have 
a property interest in a benefit, a person 
clearly must have more than an abstract 
need or desire for it. He [or she] must have 
more than a unilateral expectation of it. He 
[or she] must, instead, have a legitimate 
claim of entitlement to it." Id. 
[4] In Board of Regents v. Roth, the 
United States Supreme Court stated that 
public employees have a property interest 
in continued employment if contractual or 
statutory provisions guarantee continued 
employment absent "sufficient cause" for 
discharge. See id. at 576-78, 92 S.Ct. at 
2708-10. If a property interest in contin-
ued employment exists, then the employee 
is entitled to procedures comporting with 
the minimum requirements of due process, 
as provided in the Constitution. See Cleve-
2. The Utah Supreme Court has referred to public 
employment as a property right requiring due 
nroc ess unon discharge See Vvorrall v Ozden 
land Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 
532, 541, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 1492, 84 L.Ed.2d 
494 (1985) ("Minimum [procedural] re-
quirements [are] a matter of federal law[;] 
they are not diminished by the fact that the 
State may have specified its own procedures 
that it may deem adequate for determimng 
the preconditions to adverse official ac-
tion.'" (quoting Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 
480, 491, 100 S.Ct. 1254, 1263, 63 L.Ed.2d 
552 (1980))). If no property interest exists, 
then the employee must rely solely upon 
any procedural protections afforded by con-
tract, ordinance, or state statute. 
In this case, we look to state law, specifi-
cally the Civil Service statute, Utah Code 
Ann. § 10-3-1012 (1996), to determine 
whether Lucas has a property interest m 
continued employment as a police officer ab-
sent "sufficient cause" for discharge. Sec-
tion 10-3-1012 provides, m pertinent part: 
All persons in the classified civil service 
may be suspended as provided in Section 
10-3-912, or removed from office or em-
ployment by the head of the department 
for misconduct, incompetency, failure to 
perform his [or her] duties, or failure to 
observe properly the rules of the depart-
ment, but subject to appeal by the sus-
pended or discharged person to the civil 
service commission . . . which shall fully 
hear and determine the matter. 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1012 (1996) (empha-
sis added). The statute specifically lists the 
reasons for which a civil service employee 
may be discharged. The reasons supporting 
discharge are clearly directed at employee 
behavior that "is detrimental to the efficiency 
of the employing agency." Arnett v. Kenne-
dy, 416 U.S. 134,162-63, 94 S.Ct. 1633,1648-
49, 40 L.Ed.2d 15 (1974) (interpreting statute 
providing for discharge for "such cause as 
will promote the efficiency of the s ^ ^ T 
prohibit discharge "without cause"). ™* 
language, with "unmistakable clarity/' g ^ 
civil service employees security a ^ a i n s i ^ ^ 
charge "without cause," id. at 154, 94 S.Ct 
1644, and thus limits both the departed 
the 5310^ 
3. The Utah Constitution guarantees w 
protection under article 1, section 7 
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head's and the Commission's discretion in 
making employment decisions. See Marvin 
v. King, 734 F.Supp. 346, 354 (S.D.Ind.1990) 
(stating Commission cannot base discharge 
on "arbitrary matter [upon] which employers 
of at-will employees are free to base their 
employment decisions"); Boreen v. Chnsten-
scn, 267 Mont. 405, 884 P.2d 761, 767 (1994). 
Therefore, as a civil service employee, Lucas 
had a vested right to continued employment 
absent a legal cause for termination. 
II. PRE-DEPRIVATION & 
POST-DEPRIVATION 
DUE PROCESS 
[5-7] Because section 10-3-1012 confers 
upon civil service employees a property in-
terest m continued employment, we must 
determine what process is due. The essen-
tial principle of due process requires that a 
deprivation of any significant property inter-
est "be preceded by notice and opportunity 
for hearing appropriate to the nature of the 
case." Midlane v. Central Hanover Bank & 
Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313, 70 S.Ct. 652, 
656-57, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950) (emphasis add-
ed) "An employee's right to fair notice and 
an opportunity to 'present his [or her] side of 
the story' before discharge is not a matter of 
legislative grace, but of 'constitutional guar-
antee."' Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 541, 105 
S.Ct. at 1493. Post-deprivation procedures, 
while not constitutionally guaranteed, must 
comport with due process requirements pro-
viding for a fair hearing. See Loudermill, 
4?0 U.S. at 546, 105 S.Ct. at 1496 (stating 
due process requires post-termination admin-
istrative procedures "at a meaningful time" 
^ provided by statute), see also Bunnell v 
A* the Utah Supreme Court has stated 
u e
 Process is not a technical conception with 
a
 «xed content unrelated to time, place, and 
c
"cumsunces it is llexibl e and requires such 
t ^ d P r o l C L t l o n s a s t h e Particular situa-
n
 emands In an analysis of a procedure, 
important factor is the risk of an enoneoub 
P m ? T , 0 n ° f a p n v a t e m t e r e s l throueh the 
MdiuT' a R d Lhc P l o b a b l e value, if anv, of 
H Wa/ ; ° r f l ° r s u h s l l t u t e procedural safeguards 
*** rer, ?d a t 6 0 2 T h e Loudermill Court 
^ n g l h f u u the n c x i b l h l>' of d u e P™cess ' Cc
^3res ^ ? e x i s ^nce of post-termination pro-
^«TTunat d n l l° l h e n e c e s s a r v s c ° P e o f 
^" i som 1 * 0 " P r 0 c e d m e s T h ^ Court stated 
** * * sat,cfnSianCes a P0st-depnvation hear-
l l s h
 due process requirements See 
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Industrial Comm'n, 740 P.2d 1331. 1333 
(Utah 1987) ("[E]very person who brings a 
claim in a court or at a hearing held before 
an administrative agency has a due process 
right to receive a fair trial in front of a fail* 
tribunal"). 
In Cleveland Board of Education v. Loud-
ermill, 470 U.S. 532, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 84 
L.Ed.2d 494 (1985), the United States Su-
preme Court determined what process is due 
a discharged employee with the right to con-
tinued employment. In doing so, the Court 
balanced the competing interests at stake, 
including "the private interests in retaining 
employment, the governmental interest in 
the expeditious removal of unsatisfactory em-
ployees and the avoidance of administrative 
burdens, and the risk of erroneous termi-
nation." Id. at 542-43, 105 S.Ct. at 1493; 
accord Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 
335, 96 S.Ct. 893, 903, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976). 
In light of these interests, the Court conclud-
ed that before termination, minimum due 
process entitles an employee to oral or writ-
ten notice of the charges, an explanation of 
the employer's evidence, and an opportunity 
for the employee to present his or her side of 
the story m "'something less' than a full 
evidentiary hearing." Loudermill, 470 U.S. 
at 542, 545, 105 S.Ct. at 1493, 1495 (quoting 
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 343, 96 S.Ct at 907). 
In addition, because the Ohio statute, which 
created the property interest m public em-
ployment, also provided for a full post-termi-
nation hearing, the Loudernull Court also 
determined that due process in that case 
required a full, timely post-termination hear-
ing.4 
Cleveland Bd of Educ v Loudermill, 470 U S 
532, 542 n 7, 105 S Ct 1487, 1493 n 7, 84 
L Ed 2d 494 (1985) And, in some instances, as 
Loudermill establishes, both pretermmation and 
post-termination procedures are required How-
ever, Justice Marshall emphasized m his concur-
rence in Loudermill that due process requires 
more, in that, before a decision is made to termi-
nate employment an employee should be entitled 
to test the strength of the evidence by confront-
ing and cross-examining adverse witnesses See 
id at 548-49, 105 S Ct at 1496-97 (Marshall, J , 
concurring) He aigued that better pretermma-
tion procedures would ensure against the risk of 
an erroneous deprivation, resulting m lost wages 
and undue delay See id at 549, 105 S Ct at 
1497 (Marshall, J , concurring) However al-
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Applying Loudermill, we conclude that un-
der both the Fourteenth Amendment and the 
provision in section 1Q-3-1012 for a post-
termination hearing, Lucas is entitled to due 
process by way of oral or written notice of 
the charges, an explanation of the employer's 
evidence, an opportunity to respond to the 
charges in "something less" than a full evi-
dentiary healing before termination, coupled 
with a full post-termination hearing "at a 
meaningful time." Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 
546-47,105 S.Ct. at 1495-96; see also Mondt 
v. Cheyenne Police Dep't, 924 P.2d 70, 82 
(Wyo.1996) (requiring full evidentiary hear-
ing and examination of witnesses as provided 
by statute). It is a clear abuse of discretion 
for the Commission to exercise its discretion 
in such a way as to deny due process to a 
party appearing before it. See Tolman v. 
Salt Lake County Attorney, 818 P.2d 23, 28 
(Utah Ct.App.1991). 
We therefore address Lucas's due process 
arguments in light of both constitutionally 
and statutorily required pre- and post-termi-
nation due process procedures. 
A. City's Failure to Comply with Its 
Rules and Regulations in Course 
of Disciplinary Action 
[8] Pretermination due process requires 
notice of the charges, an explanation of the 
evidence, and an opportunity to respond. To 
give effect to these constitutional protections, 
public agencies such as the Department and 
the Commission promulgate rules and regu-
lations governing disciplinary procedures. 
"In disciplinary proceedings, a public body 
must comply with its own rules and an em-
ployee being disciplined is entitled to rely 
upon those rules." Bell v. Civil Serv. 
Comm'n. 161 Ill.App.3d 644, 113 Ill.Dec. 439, 
443, 515 N.E.2d 248, 252 (1987). Lucas as-
serts that the Department deprived him of 
due process by failing to comply with its own 
procedures that limit the time to conduct an 
internal affairs investigation and that provide 
for written notice of the allegations. See 
Worrall, 616 P.2d at 601, 602 (stating officer 
had property interest in continued employ-
though arguing due process should provide more 
protection befoie termination, Justice Marshall 
concurred to the extent the parties m Loudermill 
ment requiring due process through estab-
lished guidelines to terminate that employ-
ment). 
[9] First, Murray City Police Depart-
ment Policy 555, III(E) requires the Depart-
ment complete internal affairs investigations 
within thirty days. The record shows that 
the investigation here lasted about forty-six 
days, violating Department policy. However, 
beyond merely asserting that a delay oc-
curred, Lucas reveals nothing about the de-
lay and fails to provide any evidence that the 
delay was unreasonably prolonged. A mere 
delay alone in conducting an internal affairs 
investigation does not rise to the level of a 
constitutional violation per se. See, e.g., 
Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 547, 105 S.Ct. at 
1496 (holding that nine-month delay in post-
termination hearing is not unconstitutionally 
lengthy per se). 
[10] Second, Murray City Police Depart-
ment Policy 555, III(G) requires that "[p]nor 
to any interview of an accused member as 
part of an Internal Affairs Investigation, the 
member will be given written notification of 
the allegations, and their rights and responsi-
bilities relative to the investigation." Lucas 
argues he received inadequate notice of the 
charges against him in that before his initial 
interview, he was not informed or given writ-
ten notice of the excessive force investiga-
tion, and, when the investigation changed 
focus to dishonesty, he was not told orally or 
in writing. 
Although the record shows the Depart-
ment failed to strictly comply with its proce-
dure, the fundamental requirements of due 
process were met. Lucas did not receive 
written notice of either allegations of exces-
sive force or dishonesty; however the record 
shows that Lucas did in fact have notice of 
the pending charges and was able to respon 
to the charges before the termination was 
implemented. First, although hesitant* 
Lieutenant Fondaco told Lucas that the vox-
tial interview was based on an a U e £ a t o ' ^ 
excessive force and, during the i n t e r v ^ 
Lieutenant Fondaco read Spegar>s wn 
h£ 
requested only notice and an °VPorixf^
 ( M a r . 
heard See id at 548, 105 S Ct at 14W 
shall, . 
, concurring 
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statement to Lucas. Second, the transcript 
of Lucas's polygraph test interview clearly 
shows Lucas's knowledge of Spegar's com-
plaint and Officer Snow's statement. In fact, 
Lucas repeatedly clarified that his original 
statement was not "dishonest" and that he 
"does not lie." Third, prior to termination, 
Lucas was formally notified in writing of the 
charges against him. And, finally, he was 
afforded a pretermination hearing in which 
he specifically addressed each charge and the 
evidence against him. 
Furthermore, Lucas fails to establish how 
these procedural errors were harmful, e.g., 
he did not have time to prepare for the 
hearing or, how these procedures would have 
resulted in a different outcome absent such 
errors. See, e.g., Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 
547, 105 S.Ct. at 1496; cf. State v. Knight, 
734 P.2d 913, 920 (Utah 1987) ("[T]he likeli-
hood of a different outcome must be suffi-
ciently high to undermine confidence in [the 
decision]."); State v. Villarreal, 857 P.2d 949, 
958 (Utah Ct.App.1993) (stating evidence 
must be "sufficiently inconsequential that we 
conclude there is no 'reasonable likelihood 
that the error affected the outcome of the 
proceedings'" (quoting State v. Verde, 770 
P.2d 116, 120 (Utah 1989)), ajfd, 889 P.2d 
419 (Utah 1995)). Under the facts of this 
case, we cannot say that Lucas was denied 
due process when the record shows that Lu-
cas had actual notice of the excessive force 
and dishonesty charges, received written no-
tice of the charges against him, and had a 
pretermination opportunity to respond to the 
charges. 
B- Commission's Exclusion of Retaliatory 
Discharge Evidence 
Ml Lucas argues the Commission failed 
^ provide him with a full and fair post-
u c a s a l s o
 argues that ihe Commission erred in 
granting the City's motion to exclude the evi-
den<* without 2ivin<T 
nutkin ut giving any reasoning and without dtc/n g anV f l n c l i n £ s o r conclusions to support its 
adm?011 T h l S C O u r t h a s emphasized that an 
0 j a t m , s l l a t l V e <%enc\ must make findings of fact 
n ^ ^
a r e suffiUentl\ detailed so as to permit 
BoaJ f D1 a p p e l I d l e review See Adams v 
CLtah r K "n i °f I»dus Comm n, 821 P 2d 1, 4 
view thl pPP l99U F o r us to meaningfully re-
" ' -su{fj B o a r d * findings, the findings must be 
^djary £ e n l K d^tailed and include enough sub-
acLs
 to disJose the steps by which the 
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termination hearing by excluding evidence 
supporting his theory of retaliatory dis-
charge. Before Lucas's post-termination 
hearing, the Department moved to exclude 
all evidence supporting his claim that his 
discharge was based on Lieutenant Fonda-
co's and Chief Killian's alleged bias and retal-
iatory motives. The Commission, without 
making any findings or providing any reason-
ing, granted the Department's motion. 
[12,13] Lucas challenges the exclusion of 
the retaliatory discharge evidence, arguing 
that the Commission erred in excluding evi-
dence of Lieutenant Fondaco's and Chief Kil-
lian's alleged biases and retaliatory motives, 
which Lucas claims are admissible under 
Rule 608 of the Utah Rules of Evidence and 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-24-1 (1996).5 The 
City counters by arguing such evidence was 
irrelevant and immaterial to the Commis-
sion's limited inquiry—whether Lucas was 
dishonest, and whether the charge of dishon-
esty warranted Lucas's discharge. 
[14] Before addressing Lucas's argu-
ment, we recognize that the Civil Service 
Commission is a local municipal tribunal of 
limited jurisdiction. See Piercey v. Civil 
Sew. Comm'n. 116 Utah 135, 141, 208 P.2d 
1123, 1125-26 (1949); Salt Lake City Corp., 
908 P.2d at 875. The Commission is neither 
a court of law nor a state administrative 
agency subject to the Utah Administrative 
Procedures Act (UAPA). See Tolman, 818 
P.2d at 26 n. 3 (stating UAPA only applies to 
state, not local, agency action). In addition, 
as a municipal administrative body, the Com-
mission is not bound by formal rules of evi-
dence and procedure. See Murray City Civil 
Service Commission, Rules and Regulations 
13-10 (1996) ("At all hearings the Commis-
ultimale conclusion on each factual issue was 
reached" The failure of an agencv to make 
adequate findings of fact in material issues ren-
ders its hndmgs "arbitrary and capricious" un-
less the evidence is "clear, uncontroverted and 
capable ol only one conclusion " ' " Id at 4-5 
(quoting N\rehn v Industrial Comm'n, 800 P 2d 
330, 335 (Utah Ct App 1990) (citations omitted)) 
In this case, the Commission s decision granting 
Murray City s Motion in Limine without provid-
ing any findings, conclusions, or reasoning was 
arbitrary and capricious Therefore, the Com-
mission abused its discretion 
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sion will determine the admissibility of evi-
dence and shall use as near as it deems 
practicable the rules of evidence followed in 
the Courts in this State."); cf Flicker v. 
State Dep't. of Soc. Servs., 663 P.2d 450, 453 
(Utah 1983) ("Administrative proceedings are 
usually conducted with greater flexibility and 
informality than judicial proceedings[, thus,] 
[rjigid adherence to judicial procedures in 
administrative proceedings is generally inap-
propriate because it ignores basic differences 
between judicial and administrative proce-
dures."). 
[15,16] However, although the Commis-
sion is not bound by formal rules of evidence 
and procedure, it is not above the law. See 
Tolman, 818 P.2d at 31. In the absence of 
formal legal rules, the Commission must "de-
termine what evidence should, in 'fairness/ 
be admitted." Id. The evidence must be 
legally relevant, in that it has " 'some proba-
tive weight and reliability.'" Id. (citation 
omitted). "Whether certain evidence is rele-
vant . . . is a question of law. which we 
review under a correction-of-error standard." 
State v Gonzalez, 822 P.2d 1214, 1216 (Utah 
Ct.App.1991). 
In this case, evidence relating to Chief 
Killian's and Lieutenant Fondaco's credibili-
ty, i.e., evidence of bias and retaliatory mo-
tives, is relevant and material to the Com-
mission's review of Chief Killian's decision to 
discharge Lucas. Lucas argues that Chief 
Killian's decision and Lieutenant Fondaco's 
recommendation to discharge him wTere 
based on retaliation. It is widely recognized 
that an employer's motive is a key element of 
retaliatory discharge. See Lihosit v. I & W, 
Inc., 121 N.M. 455, 913 P.2d 262, 265 
(N.M.Ct.App.1996). Moreover, under both 
the Utah Rules of Evidence and Utah law, 
evidence of a witness's motive or bias is 
admissible to challenge that witness's credi-
bility. 
[17] Rule 608(c) of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence provides that "[b]ias, prejudice or 
any motive to misrepresent may be shown to 
impeach the witness either by examination of 
the witness or by evidence otherwise ad-
A„~A » Q i r m l n r l v TTtflh P o d p 4 l U L % 7 8 ~ 2 4 ~ 
in every case[,] the credibility of the wit-
ness may be drawn into question, by the 
manner in which he [or she] testifies, by 
the character of his [or her] testimony, or 
by evidence affecting his [or her] character 
for truth, honesty or integrity, or by his 
[or her] motives, or by contradictory evi-
dence. 
Utah case law supports the well estabhshed 
principle that testimony reflecting on the 
bias and motives of a witness is admissible at 
trial. See Ong Int'l (U.S.A) Inc. v. 11th Ave. 
Corp., 850 P.2d 447, 459 (Utah 1993); State v. 
Hackfora\ 737 P.2d 200, 203 (Utah 1987); 
State v. Leonard, 707 P.2d 650, 656 (Utah 
1985); State v. Patterson, 656 P.2d 438, 438 
(Utah 1982). Although the Commission is 
not bound by formal rules, due process re-
quires that in a full post-termination hearing, 
an employee be given an opportunity to in-
troduce evidence and cross-examine wit-
nesses, which includes challenging witness 
credibility. See Post v. Harper, 980 F.2d 
491, 493 (8th Cir.1992). 
In this case, the Commission's role is limit-
ed to either affirming or reversing the 
Chiefs decision to terminate Lucas, a deci-
sion based in part on Lieutenant Fondaco's 
recommendation. The Commission relied on 
the testimonies of Chief Killian, Lieutenant 
Fondaco, and Martin Spegar in reaching its 
decision to affirm the Chiefs discharge or-
der. The excluded evidence of Chief Killian's 
and Lieutenant Fondaco's intent, bias, and 
motives directly relates to their credibility 
The Commission's exclusion of the retaliatory 
discharge evidence prevented Lucas from 
challenging the credibility of two primary 
witnesses.^ In addition, the Commission's 
failure to consider evidence challenging Chief 
Killian's credibility effectively prevented the 
Commission from properly reviewing the 
Chiefs decision to "terminate Lucas. See 
Tolman, 818 P.2d at 32 (holding County Ca-
reer Services Council's failure to consider 
terminated employee's legal contentions pre-
vented fair review of county attorney's deci-
sion to terminate employee). Tnerefof'ev^ 
Commission erred m excluding Lucas s 
dence of retaliatory discharge ^cause 
evidence was relevant to Chief Killian s ^ 
ibility and to the Commission's ^ ^ ^
 cf 
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Review of Indus. Comm'n, 748 P.2d 569, 572 
(Utah 1987) (holding Commission erred in 
excluding critically relevant and material tes-
timony). 
[18,19] Murray City, however, argues 
that even if the Commission erred in exclud-
ing the evidence regarding Lucas's claim of 
retaliatory discharge, the error was harm-
less. Murray City correctly notes that a[a]n 
erroneous decision to admit or exclude evi-
dence does not constitute reversible error 
unless the error is harmful." Cat Wads-
toorth Constr. v. St. George, 898 P.2d 1372. 
1378 (Utah 1995). However, as stated above, 
the evidence Lucas proffered directly relates 
to the credibility of Chief Killian and Lieu-
tenant Fondaco, two of the three witnesses 
whose testimony the Commission relied upon 
in reaching its decision. In addition, because 
the Commission is limited to either affirming 
or reversing the Chiefs decision, his credibil-
ity, motives, and bias are directly at issue. 
Had the Commission heard the retaliatory 
discharge evidence, there is a substantial 
likelihood of a different outcome sufficient to 
undermine our confidence in the Commis-
sion's decision to affirm Lucas's discharge. 
See Harhne v. Barker, 912 P.2d 433, 442 
(Utah 1996). 
Thus, because the credibility of both Lieu-
tenant Fondaco and Chief Killian is directly 
relevant and material to the Commission's 
fair evaluation of the Chiefs decision to ter-
minate Lucas, the Commission erred in ex-
cluding the evidence supporting Lucas's 
c&m of retaliatory discharge. The Commis-
sion thereby violated Lucas's right to due 
process in excluding the evidence of retaliato-
ry discharge and preventing Lucas from ef-
fc&vely challenging witness credibility. 
Commission's Exclusion of Audiotape 
for Impeachment Purposes 
i During the tape-recorded polygraph 
a ^ * w ' Spegar acknowledged that he 
fceat n b e e n m i s t a k e n a s t 0 t h e P l ace_ 
fe*ve h i SS g u n» stating the gun could 
^ * *
n
 Ported at his head, his torso, or 
«3caminad e floor- However, during cross-
Speg^
 d °
n
.
a t t h e
 Post-termination hearing, 
fcstified thmed m a k l n g t h a t s t a t e m e n t a n d 1 h e
 ^ew the gun was pointed 
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directly at him. Lucas attempted to impeach 
Spegar by playing the tape-recording of Spe-
gar's polygraph interview. The Commission, 
however, via its legal advisor's sua sponte 
ruling, excluded the audiotape for lack of 
foundation, concluding that Spegar could not 
authenticate his own voice. 
We agree the Commission may have 
erred in excluding the audiotape evidence 
for lack of foundation. See Utah R. Evid. 
901(b)(5) (allowing party to authenticate own 
voice): see, e.g., People v. Williams, 16 
Cal.4th 635, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 573, 589, 941 
P.2d 752, 768 (1997) (stating audiotape ad-
missible upon detective's testimony that he 
was party to recorded conversation). How-
ever, the Commission did not prevent Lucas 
from impeaching Spegar. Lucas had access 
to, but failed to avail himself of, other 
means available to impeach Spegar at the 
time he testified, e.g., the transcribed copy 
of the polygraph interview. The transcrip-
tion was later admitted into evidence, but 
never used to impeach Spegar. Therefore, 
the error was harmless. See State v. 
Knight, 734 R2d 913, 920 (Utah 1987); ac-
cord VilLaireal, S57 P.2d at 957-58. 
D. Commission's Authority to Allow Legal 
Advisor's Active Participation 
[21] Lucas argues that the Commission 
exceeded its statutorily limited authority in 
allowing its legal advisor to actively partici-
pate, question, and make sua sponte rulings 
as to the admissibility of evidence during the 
hearing. We disagree. There is nothing in 
either the statute creating the Commission's 
authority, Utah Code Ann. §§ 10-3-1001 to -
1013 (1996), or the Murray City Civil Service 
Commission's Rules and Regulations to pre-
clude or limit the Commission's use of a legal 
advisor. Further, because the Commission 
must deal with both evidentiary rules and 
legal issues, advice from independent legal 
counsel may in many cases be necessary. A 
conflict wTould arise if the Commission's legal 
advisor simultaneously served as both an ad-
vocate and an advisor. See Hamilton v. City 
of Mesa, 185 Ariz. 420, 916 P.2d 1136, 1143 
(Ariz.Ct.App.1995). However, absent a 
showing of any actual bias or partiality, there 
is no due process violation. See, e.g., id 
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(holding city manager seeking advice from 
independent legal advisor, absent showing of 
actual bias or partiality, insufficient to estab-
lish due process violation). In this case, the 
Commission did not exceed its authority by 
either deferring to the independent advisor's 
legal advice or acquiescing to the advisor's 
active participation in the hearing. The ulti-
mate responsibility for all these matters 
rests with the Commission, and it is at liber-
ty to rely upon the advice of its chosen legal 
advisor. 
III. COMMISSION'S REVIEW 
OF CHIEF'S DECISION 
[22] Section 10-3-1012 states the Com-
mission "shall fully hear and determine" ap-
peals of suspension or termination brought 
by civil service employees. The Utah Su-
preme Court, in Vetterli v. Civil Service 
Commission, 106 Utah 83, 145 P.2d 792 
(1944), established that the Commission's re-
view of disciplinary decisions mvolves two 
inquiries: (1) do the facts support the 
charges made by the department head, and, 
if so, (2) do the charges warrant the sanction 
imposed? See id., 145 P.2d at 796; In re 
Discharge of Jones, 720 P.2d 1356, 1361 
(Utah 1986). If the Commission answers no 
to either of these inquiries, it must reverse 
the department head's actions. 
A. Factual Basis for Dishonesty Charge 
[23,24] We first address whether the 
facts support the charge of dishonesty. In 
addressing this issue, we must determine the 
appropriate standard of review to be applied 
to the Commission's findings. As stated 
above, the Commission is a local, municipal 
agency regulating employment in the police, 
fire, and health departments; it monitors 
hiring, promotion, suspension, and termi-
nation in those city agencies. See Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 10-3-1001 to -1011 (1996); accord 
Salt Lake City Corp., 908 P.2d at 875. The 
Commission also hears appeals from depart-
ment heads' suspension and termination deci-
sions. See Utah Code. Ann. §§ 10-3-1012 
to -1012.5 (1996). Although the Commission 
is not subject to UAPA, it functions similarly 
to such state administrative agencies as the 
Career Service Review Board. See, e.g., 
Kent v. Department of Employment Sec, 860 
P.2d 984, 985 (Utah CtApp.1993) (stating 
sole purpose of Career Service Review Board 
is reviewing agency decisions regarding ca-
reer service employees). Therefore, we 
adopt and apply the "substantial evidence" 
standard applicable to a state administrative 
agency's findings of fact. 
[25,26] The Commission's findings, upon 
which the charges are based, must be sup-
ported by substantial evidence viewed in 
light of the whole record before us. See 
Larson Limestone Co. v. State, 903 P.2d 429, 
430 (Utah 1995). Substantial evidence "'is 
that quantum and quality of relevant evi-
dence that is adequate to convince a reason-
able mind to support a conclusion.'" Id 
(quoting First Nat'l Bank v. County Bd. of 
Equalization, 799 P.2d 1163, 1165 (Utah 
1990)); see also A.M.L. v. Department of 
Health, 863 P.2d 44, 47 (Utah.Ct.App.1993) 
(stating evidence is not substantial if over-
whelmed by other evidence or based on mere 
conclusion). It is more than a mere " 'scintil-
la' of evidence and something less than the 
weight of the evidence." Johnson v Board 
of Review of Indus. Comm'n, 842 P.2d 910, 
911 (Utah.CtApp.1992) (citation omitted) 
We do not review the Commission's findings 
de novo or reweigh the evidence. See Lar-
son Limestone, 903 P.2d at 431. Instead, we 
defer to the Commission's findings on issues 
of credibility. 
Based on our examination of the whole 
record, we cannot say the Commission's find-
ing that Lucas lied about his gun's position is 
supported by substantial, competent evi-
dence. Initially, we note that the allegation 
of dishonesty arose from, as Murray City 
acknowledged in its brief, an unsubstantiated 
claim of excessive force. The internal affairs 
investigation into Lucas's use of excessive 
force was never completed and never rw 
upon by the Commission. In addition, tnc 
evidence presented in support of the ex 
sive force charge was inconsistent and un 
roborated. For instance, Spegar, who is ^ 
only eyewitness to Lucas's alleged us 
excessive force, gave many incons 
statements regarding the circumstances ^ 
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rounding his arrest and subsequent search.6 
Particularly questionable are Spegar's state-
ments that Lucas's gun could have been 
pointed at his head, his torso, below his 
waist, or at the ground. At the hearing, 
Spegar testified that although he "didn't look 
over at [Lucas]," he "knew" the gun was 
pointed at him, but he could not "justify 
whether it was at [his] head or not." In 
addition, Spegar's claim that Lucas threat-
ened to "blow his brains all over the wall" 
was allegedly corroborated by Garcia who 
testified to hearing the threat in the inter-
view room approximately twenty to thirty 
feet away from Spegar. However, Hamblin, 
who was detained in the office next to Spe-
gar, and Officer Snow, who had just left 
Garcia in the interview room and was en 
route to take Spegar's statement, heard 
nothing. 
In addition, the Commission heard and 
relied upon the statements of Chief Killian 
and Lieutenant Fondaco, the credibility of 
whom Lucas was prevented from challeng-
ing. The post-termination hearing transcript 
shows that Lieutenant Fondaco's and Chief 
Kilhan's testimony on the dishonesty issue 
was largely conclusory and speculative as 
they testified mainly regarding their percep-
tions of the evidence. For example, without 
any proof, and contrary to the testimony of 
the only eyewitness, Chief Killian testified 
that "I know [the gun] wasn't two inches 
from the holster," and Lieutenant Fondaco 
testified that "I am of the firm belief that 
Officer Lucas took his gun out of his holster, 
Pointed it at Marty Spegar and then denied 
that tact to me in an internal affairs investi-
gation." 
to support of the charge of dishonesty, the 
Commission re i lecl primarily upon its finding 
a t Luca
*> ^ed about his gun's position dur-
' _ P c ' g a r £dve four statements regarding the aile-
ron of extessn e force—the written statement 
oral VVUh t h e c l a , m o f e x c e s s i v e f o r c e ' t h e 
gjr^ m i e n , l e U U l l h L i e u l e n a n L Fondaco, Spe-
I&H* l r a , n s C n b e d a r L s v v e r s from the polygraph 
nation^ l e s l l m o n v a t Lucas's post-termi-
*Wiem n n g R e M c w i n g the record, Spegar'* 
-*aichttU,rParl ,<"ul<irIy l h o s c d e s c n b m S h l b 
^ e x T t l g U n S p I a c e m e n t ' m s demeanor, 
^friend ^ h e n , l l e discussed the incident with 
*ndare % ^ * r o m o n e s t a l e m e n t to the next 
ins i s ten t a a u hole. For instance, at 
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ing his search of Spegar. Specifical 
Commission found "Officer Lucas's 
ments regarding the holstering and 
stering of his weapon to be inconsistei 
not credible[, and to have] . . . changec 
stantially in subsequent interviews froi 
statement initially given Lieutenant F 
co." The Commission based its finding 
Lucas's three transcribed interviews an 
testimony given during the post-termin 
hearing. 
Contrary to the Commission's finding, 
cas's statements regarding the events 
rounding Spegar's arrest, his subseqi 
search, and the position of Lucas's £ 
whether holstered or unholstered, were c 
sistent. The transcripts of Lucas's inl 
views and hearing testimony reveal that 
clearly and consistently maintained that 
perceived his gun to be holstered, but recc 
nized the possibility his gun could have be 
unholstered and pointed at the floor, as w 
nessed by a fellow officer. 
The evidence shows that the internal s 
fairs investigation of Lucas began with s 
allegation of excessive force. In a writte 
statement, Spegar alleged: 
[Officer Lucas] told me to stand up an* 
empty my pockets onto the table, and als< 
to take off my hat. He then asked me tc 
wait before I did it. He [illegible] for i 
minute and took out his gun from his 
holster and pointed it in the direction of 
my head. He was standing about 3 feet 
away from me. He then [said,] "I dare 
you to pull out a gun because if you do I 
swear that I will . . kill you," and that my 
brains will be splattered on the wall! 
Based on this allegation, Lieutenant Fondaco 
initiated the internal affairs investigation. In 
the first of three interviews, Lieutenant Fon-
daco read the above allegation to Lucas and 
the hearing, Spegar for the first time related that 
he had been searched up against the wall before 
Lucas pulled out his gun, he stated that he was 
both thoroughly and cursorily searched at the 
scene of the arrest, that he had nothing m his 
pockets when Lucas searched him at the station, 
although Officer Snow testified that he saw sev-
eral items, including pliers, emptied from his 
pocket, that the gun was both pointed at hu> 
head and that it was not, that he did not remem-
ber where the gun was, and that it was just 
pointed m his general direction or at his waist 
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asked "Is any of that true?" The following is 
the exchanged dialogue. 
LUCAS: The part that I had searched 
him, yes it is. And when I went to search 
him, he took his other hand, and he was 
going right down, he had baggies on you 
know. And he hadn't been adequately 
searched yet. He went right down to his 
crotch so I unsnapped my gun and said 
"don't do that." So then I put him against 
the wall and I searched him. But as far as 
that other crap, no. 
FONDACO: Okay. So, you unsnapped 
your gun, put him against the wall and 
searched him, but you never took your gun 
out of the holster. 
LUCAS: No, I unsnapped it you know 
because I didn't know what he was doing. 
As soon as his hand came out, you know 
that was it. It was done. I put him 
against the wall and I searched his crotch 
real good you know. I said "what the heck 
are you doing." . . a scratch. I said, well 
that's pretty stupid, you know. I'm here 
searching you for weapons and stuff and 
you put your hand down your pants, you 
know. He said, yeah that was pretty stu-
pid. 
FONDACO: So, I just want to make sure 
I'm right. You unsnapped your weapon, 
left it in the holster, then put him on the 
wall, patted him down again, and then had 
him empty his pockets, but your weapon 
never came out of the holster. You never 
pointed your weapon at him? You never 
pointed your weapon at his head? 
LUCAS: No. 
FONDACO: You never threatened to kill 
him? 
LUCAS: No. 
Shortly after, Officer Snow gave a written 
statement, in which he acknowledged seeing 
Lucas with his gun out of its holster, at his 
side, pointing down at the ground. Lucas 
was interviewed a second time, m conjunction 
with a polygraph test he agreed to take, and 
a third time, by Chief Killian in Lucas's 
pretermination interview. In both inter-
views, Lucas's version of the events sur-
rounding Spegar's arrest and subsequent 
search remained consistent. In both mter-
that his gun could have been unholstered and 
pointed at the floor. However, consistent 
with his original interview, he repeatedly 
stated that he perceived his gun had been 
holstered. 
In his second interview, Lucas stated. 
I had my hand on him. Had my 
weapon unsnapped, and I was leaning for-
ward. I'm not looking down at my gun to 
see exactly where it is you know. In hind-
sight maybe the officer walking by, he said 
my gun was out and pointed down. That's 
understandable. He may have seen it. It 
is possible because when I'm leaning for-
ward, I'm not paying attention over 
there — 
Like I said, I had it unsnapped, I had a full 
grasp on it, leaning on him, leaning for-
ward as he went to the wall. In my per-
ception and I asked about it, is all I did is 
grab [my gun], but you know in hindsight, 
if I'm leaning forward and my adrenalin is 
up and I got my gun uncocked as you will, 
it [could] likely come out. Then I get 
another officer who I have never known to 
be deceptive saying that he saw it clear 
leather, and I told him to always be hon-
est, and if that's what he saw, that's what 
he saw and to stick with it because I have 
nothing to hide. And I don't. 
But, whenever I was asked about it, I said 
it was in my holster, and that's my percep-
tion. Now I'm getting information con-
trary to that so it makes me think, now I 
have doubts. 
During his pretermination interview, Lu-
cas stated: 
[W]hen I was interviewed [by] Lieutenant 
Fondaco, I clearly told him that the gw 
didn't come out of the holster. It was in 
my holster, unsnapped. I'm leaning for-
ward, pushing this guy away from me, so 
I'm leaning away, and my gun is in an 
out, sliding up and down. It could have 
been beside me, it could have been pom 
mg at the floor. My perception was it 
in the holster. But, now I have an offi 
who says he walks by and sees it po ^ 
at the floor, okay. I'm not real clear 
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I was sure it didn't come cut of the holster. 
Then the other parameters are introduced. 
Is it possible? Yes, it is possible. Am I 
sure? No, I'm not sure. It could be possi-
ble because my focus is on this son of a 
gun now that's toying with me, not on [the 
exact placement of my gun] by two or 
three inches. 
Finally, during the post-termination hear-
ing. Lucas testified at length that he believed 
then and now that his gun was holstered. 
Lucas stated. 
I told him that when I was interviewed by-
Lieutenant Fondaco, I told him that I was 
100 percent sure that my gun never left 
my holster. When I came out of the inter-
view and met with Officer Snow, Officer 
Snow told me that he saw me with my gun 
pointed to the floor. At that point, I had 
doubts. 
Lucas clearly testified that to his knowledge, 
hih gun was holstered. However, he recog-
nized that Snows statement raised doubts in 
hib mind about his own perception of his 
gun's position. 
Based on our review of the record, Spe-
gar's inconsistent statements regarding the 
placement of Lucas's gun—pointed at his 
head, torso, or the floor, the unsubstantiated 
allegation of excessive force. Officer SnowY 
statement that he did not see Lucas's gun 
pointed at Spegar, combined with Lucas's 
statements, the Commission's finding that 
Lucas lied is not supported by substantial 
evidence. However, even ii we were to as-
sume that Lucas lied about the position of his 
jrun—holstered or unnolstered and pointed a: 
*he ground—dismissal for the charge of dis-
honesty under these circumstances is neitner 
compiled
 n o r sunpoited by the record. 
&• Termination Disproportionate 
to Charge 
^12<,2S] Luu s^ argues that, under the 
-w* <>f this case and in light of his outstar.d-
f ^r*I(,e ivi-orri. femLiaricn is an exce<-
?*'"' dlM,1Phnary action : > his alleged of-
""* '
 n
 determirinir wnetrer :ne char~^ 
-
4M f<^c:fJiuiar~ acne" ta]:°r -v.- ,•-
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(
' Miat (....-c-iine in-.-f-ed f™ en:-
*' ^^-'Jimuct i* within rh- ^uno d^crc-
CIVIL SERVICE COM'N Ua*. 
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tion of the Chief. See In re D wim 
Jonea. 720 P.2d at 1363 (stating Chief 
manage and direct his officers, and thus 
best position to know whether then* ac 
merit discipline). This discretion is abi 
however, if the punishment exceeds 
range of sanctions permitted by statut< 
regulation, or if, in light of ail the eire 
stances, the punishment is disproportioi 
to the offense. See id.; see also Boya 
United States, 211 Ct.Cl. 57, 543 F.2d 1: 
1295 (1976) (" 'If a penalty is so harsh as 
constitute an abuse, rather than an exerc 
of discretion, it cannot be allowed to stand 
(citations omitted)). 
[29] Initially, Lucas argues that t 
Chief and the Commission abused then* d 
cretion by violating the policy and procedu 
requiring progressive discipline and imposii 
a punishment exceeding that permitted m 
der the rules and regulations. Section 11-
of the Murray City Civil Service Commit 
sion's Rules and Regulations, provides, i 
pertinent part-
Basic responsibility for discipline is vestei 
in the appointing power of each depart 
ment and not in either the Civil Servict 
Commission or the Mayor. Progressive 
discipline which normally involves a verbal 
reprimand, written reprimand, suspension 
and termination shall be administered fair-
ly and consistently by the appointing pow-
er. Severity of the offense will determine 
the steps required for progressive disci-
pline. 
Murray City Civil Serice Commission Rules 
and Regulations. * 11-1 (1996). Clearly, 
Murray City adheres to a progre^sh'0 disci-
pline policy: howevpr, the rule does not man-
date the use of progressive discipline In ev-
ery situation. 
The Nebraska Supreme Court in Percrco1 
v. Depar+-)icr<i of Coir, czwnal Semccx, 23U 
Neb. 508. 44c N.W.2d 211 (1989,% interpret 
a rule Siini'ar to tne cue In this ca^e and heiu 
tnat tne u^e of progressive discipline ia dis-
cretionary with the department dn'ector. In 
Perci>'( \ :;tc ctatc Personnel Board dem^v' 
ana tr^isitrred an emp'oyee within fiv- De-
partment of ^rreeuonai Service^ *VL K. 
^4~ N 1 V 2 ; ;- 21-. 7 ^ fcincui e- artru-
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that the degree of discipline imposed was 
contrary to the state's policy of progressive 
discipline. See id, at 213. Nebraska's per-
sonnel rules and regulations provided that 
"disciplinary actions are prescribed in a pro-
gressive mannerf;] however, the nature and 
severity of the violation will dictate the level 
of discipline imposed." Id, The rule recom-
mended the department's use of progressive 
discipline, except where an employee com-
mits an offense of "serious magnitude." Id. 
The court interpreted this provision, which is 
similar to the rule applicable to this case, as 
giving the department director discretion in 
implementing the steps of progressive disci-
pline. See id.; see also Brougham v. City of 
Normandy, 812 S.W.2d 919, 924 (Mo.Ct.App. 
1991) (interpreting ordinance adhering to 
principles of progressive discipline to be 
guide rather than mandate); Battiste v. De-
partment of Soc. Servs., 154 MicLApp. 486, 
398 N.W.2d 447, 450 (1986) ("Progressive 
discipline may be utilized at the discretion of 
the commission . . . where an agency is given 
discretion to 'suspend or dismiss' an employ-
ee for cause.'"). We follow the Percival 
courts reasoning and hold that the use of 
progressive discipline is committed to the 
Chiefs discretion, based on the Chiefs deter-
mination of the severity of the offense. 
Moreover, under the Murray City Police 
Department Policies and Procedures, § 555, 
IX (A), an officer may be disciplined, which 
includes termination, for untruthfulness in an 
internal affairs investigation. Under the De-
partment's stated policies, the Chief may im-
pose a range of punishment from reprimand 
to termination for the charge of dishonesty. 
We agree with Murray City's statement that 
police officers are "in a position of trust" and 
are thus "held to the highest standards of 
behavior." Paulino i\ Civil Sew. Commit, 
175 Ca2:App.3d 962, 221 Cal.Rptr. 90. 96 
(1985). "[Hjonesty and credibility are crucial 
to [an officer's] proper performance of his [or 
her] duties." Id.; see also Ackerman v. Cal-
ifornia State Personnel Bd., 145 Cal.App.3d 
cOc, 192 Cal.Rptr. 190. 193 1983^ ("'Dishon-
esty in such matters of public trust is intoler-
able.' " (citation omitted);. As such, under 
the Department's rules 2TL(I reirulations, the 
rather than progressive discipline in cas 
involving dishonesty. 
[30] Both the Commission's and the I 
partment's rules, however, require that a: 
discipline be administered fairly and cons: 
tentiy. See Murray City Sendee Commi 
sion's Rules and Regulation, Section 11-
(1996); see also Murray City Police Depai 
ment Policies and Procedures, § 520, I vrei 
erating policy that "like penalties be impost 
for like offenses"). The record reveals th; 
in only one other case has an officer be* 
discharged for dishonesty. In that case, tl 
officer, with two-and-one-half years of exper 
ence, falsified police reports, falsified worl 
ers compensation claims, falsified proper! 
reports, and damaged City property to cove 
the lies. However, in the two other case 
involving the sole charge of dishonesty, on 
officer was suspended for one day, and th 
other officer was suspended for two week; 
In light of all the circumstances, we con 
elude that, even assuming that Lucas wa 
dishonest regarding the placement of hi; 
gun—bolstered or unholstered—termination 
is so disproportionate to the charge that i 
amounts to an abuse of the Chiefs discretion 
First, the dishonesty charge was based on ar 
unsubstantiated claim of excessive force— 
which never conclusively determined tht 
placement of Lucas's gun. Second, the evi-
dence supporting the dishonesty charge was 
slim and inconsistent. Third, the record 
shows that other officers disciplined solely 
for dishonesty were suspended rather than 
discharged. Finally. Lucas's service record 
is exemplary. Lucas has served as a Murray 
City police officer for twelve years. Dunn? 
that time. Lucas's record shows that he hart 
at all times met or exceeded the Depart-
ment's expectations, and, based on the com-
ments in the service record, Lucas was con-
sidered an excellent officer. According to 
Lucas's record, there is no evidence of an> 
oral or written reprimands, warnings, or ae-
cipiinary action taken against him. To t.c 
contrary, the record shows that Lucas ^ -
only Murray City police officer to have re-
ceived the Merit of Honor award. 
Even assuming that Lucas was ^ h ° * J 
ahort t*P rv^itinn of his eun, termina -> -_ 
' ^ ^ ' ^ ^ - r . - ^ r ^ under the fee* v' 
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this case tc the charge of dishonesty that it 
amounted to an abuse of the Chiefs discre-
tion. Therefore, the Commission abused its 
discretion in affirming the Chiefs decision 
ordering that Lucas be terminated. 
CONCLUSION 
Under Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1012, a 
civil service employee has a vested property 
interest in continued employment absent suf-
ficient cause for discharge. Therefore, be-
fore termination, a civil service employee is 
entitled to due process requiring oral or writ-
ten notice of the charges, an explanation of 
the employer's evidence, an opportunity to 
respond to the charges in "something less" 
than a full evidentiary hearing before termi-
nation, coupled with a full post-termination 
hearing "at a meaningful time." 
We conclude that Lucas's due process 
rights were not violated by the delay in the 
internal affairs investigation, the lack of 
written notice of the allegations where Lucas 
had actual notice, the exclusion of the audio-
tape evidence for impeachment purposes, or 
the Commission's use of a legal advisor. 
However, because evidence supporting Lu-
cas's retaliatory discharge claim was directly 
relevant and material to Chief Killian's and 
Lieutenant Fondaco's credibility and was re-
quired for the Commission's proper review of 
Chief Killian's decision, the Commission's ex-
clusion of such evidence violated Lucas's due 
process right to a full and fair hearing. 
In addition, we conclude the Commission 
abused its discretion in affirming Chief Killi-
to's decision to discharge Officer Lucas. 
First, the Commission's finding that Officer 
Lucas was dishonest was not supported by 
substantial evidence. Second, even if the 
evidence supported such a finding, termi-
^ o n & so disproportionate to the charge of 
"Aonesty under the facts of this case as to 
^ount to an abuse of the Chiefs discretion. 
J [ k ^ision of the Commission upholding 
^ Killian's termination of Officer Lucas is 
ersed. Officer Lucas is reinstated with 
**ck pay. 
DAvfc.P.J.. concurs. 
"
/ C H
»
 Judge (concurring in the result): 
-FactjJ CpnCUr ^ l t h t h e analysis captioned 
Basis for Dishonestv Charge" in 
section III of the main opinion. As set forth 
therein, the evidence simply does not support 
the Commission's finding that Lucas lied 
about the position of his gun when he 
searched Spegar at the station. That discus-
sion being dispositive, I would not opine 
about other aspects of the case. 
As recognized by the main opinion, Lucas 
asks alternatively for reinstatement or a new 
hearing. He first contends that the Commis-
sion should be reversed and that he should 
be reinstated with back pay because the facts 
do not support termination for the dishonesty 
charge and, in any event, termination is dis-
proportionate to the charge. As an alterna-
tive argument, he contends that he is entitled 
to another hearing because his rights to due 
process were violated. 
I share some of the main opinion's con-
cerns over whether Lucas was afforded due 
process at the hearing before the Commis-
sion. I am particularly bothered by the 
Commission's exclusion of evidence that Lu-
cas was discharged out of retaliation for hav-
ing filed misconduct claims against Lieuten-
ant Fondaco and the Murray City Police 
Department. However, given our decision to 
reinstate Lucas without any further hearing, 
the discussions about due process and pro-
portionality are mere dicta, which may or 
may not be correct. 
I therefore concur only in the result. 
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amounted to an abuse of the Chiefs discre-
tion. Therefore, the Commission abused its 
discretion in affirming the Chiefs decision 
ordering that Lucas be terminated. 
CONCLUSION 
Under Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1012, a 
civil service employee has a vested property 
interest in continued employment absent suf-
ficient cause for discharge. Therefore, be-
fore termination, a civil service employee is 
entitled to due process requiring oral or writ-
ten notice of the charges, an explanation of 
the employer's evidence, an opportunity to 
respond to the charges in "something less" 
than a fall evidentiary hearing before termi-
nation, coupled with a full post-termination 
hearing "at a meaningful time." 
We conclude that Lucas's due process 
rights were not violated by the delay in the 
internal affairs investigation, the lack of 
written notice of the allegations where Lucas 
had actual notice, the exclusion of the audio-
tape evidence for impeachment purposes, or 
the Commission's use of a legal advisor. 
However, because evidence supporting Lu-
cas's retaliatory discharge claim was directly 
relevant and material to Chief Killian's and 
Lieutenant Fondaco's credibility and was re-
quired for the Commission's proper review of 
Chief Killian's decision, the Commission's ex-
clusion of such evidence violated Lucas's due 
process right to a full and fair hearing. 
In addition, we conclude the Commission 
abused its discretion in affirming Chief Killi-
aa's decision to discharge Officer Lucas. 
First, the Commission's finding that Officer 
Lucas was dishonest was not supported by 
substantial evidence. Second, even if the 
evidence supported such a finding, termi-
nation is so disproportionate to the charge of 
honesty under the facts of this case as to 
amo
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CjSf ?ec is lon of t h e Commission upholding 
^ Lilian's termination of Officer Lucas is 
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**ck pay 
D A V
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section III of the main opinion. As set forth 
therein, the evidence simply does not support 
the Commission's finding that Lucas lied 
about the position of his gun when he 
searched Spegar at the station. That discus-
sion being dispositive, I would not opine 
about other aspects of the case. 
As recognized by the main opinion, Lucas 
asks alternatively for reinstatement or a new 
hearing. He first contends that the Commis-
sion should be reversed and that he should 
be reinstated with back pay because the facts 
do not support termination for the dishonesty 
charge and, in any event, termination is dis-
proportionate to the charge. As an alterna-
tive argument, he contends that he is entitled 
to another hearing because his rights to due 
process were violated. 
I share some of the main opinion's con-
cerns over whether Lucas was afforded due 
process at the hearing before the Commis-
sion. I am particularly bothered by the 
Commission's exclusion of evidence that Lu-
cas was discharged out of retaliation for hav-
ing filed misconduct claims against Lieuten-
ant Fondaco and the Murray City Police 
Department. However, given our decision to 
reinstate Lucas without any further hearing, 
the discussions about due process and pro-
portionality are mere dicta, which may or 
may not be correct. 
I therefore concur only in the result. 
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